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International Law in National Schools
RYAN M. SCOVILLE*
Why is international law ineffective at times in achieving its aims, such as preventing
human rights abuses, forestalling armed conflict, and ensuring global cooperation
on matters ranging from the environment to nuclear proliferation? This Article offers
original empirical research to suggest that an important and underappreciated part
of the answer lies in legal education. Conducting a global survey on the study of
international law at thousands of law schools in over 190 countries, the Article reveals significant cross-national disparities in the pervasiveness of international legal
training, and draws on other research to highlight similar variations in instructional
quality, topical emphases, and ideological orientation.
The central claim is that these conditions are likely to inhibit the efficacy of international law. In states where training in international law is widespread, rigorous,
and supportive of the discipline, universities may contribute materially to norm
awareness, utilization, and even obedience over the long run. But in the significant
number of states where training is unavailable or limited, poor in quality, or critical
of global norms, universities plausibly generate a neutral or opposite effect. Moreover, the fact of cross-national variation in these conditions likely imposes a systemic
limit on the coherence and value of international law. This analysis suggests an expansive research agenda for scholars and may carry important implications for U.S.
law schools, as well as universities and foreign ministries around the world.
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INTRODUCTION
International law addresses an array of foreign and domestic issues, but appears
at times to be ineffective. States have committed inter alia to honor free speech, fight
transnational crime, protect the environment, and refrain from the offensive use of
force, but reports of significant violations are not uncommon. Russia invades
Ukraine.1 North Korea tortures prisoners.2 The Syrian military violates a longstanding prohibition on the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure.3 China
makes unfounded maritime claims in the South China Sea.4 And even in the West,
respect for human rights is far from complete.5
Scholars have offered a number of explanations for this state of affairs. Some
point to the absence of centralized enforcement as a major contributor. On this view,
international norms are at times ineffective because there is no supranational government with power and authority to force compliance.6 In contrast, others have argued
that domestic political conditions play a part—in states where there is no internal
rule of law, leaders are less likely to respect external legal constraints on their behavior.7 Still others contend that inadequate financial and informational resources limit
the capacity of states to honor international obligations,8 or that major international
institutions feature design defects that compromise the perceived legitimacy of the

1. David M. Herszenhorn, Fears Rise as Russian Military Units Pour into Ukraine, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2014, at A5.
2. Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Council on its Twenty-Fifth Session, ¶¶ 60, 62, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/63 (Feb. 7, 2014).
3. Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. of the U.N. Human
Rights Council Thirtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/48 (Aug. 13, 2015).
4. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, NO. 143, CHINA: MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf
[https://perma.cc/44L5-RS5A].
5. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, REPORT 2014/15: THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN
RIGHTS (2015) (documenting rights violations around the world, including in the West).
6. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1824–26 (2009) (summarizing this
argument).
7. E.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 503, 510 n.13 (1995).
8. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998).
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contemporary order.9 These are important contributions, but they are also incomplete
as explanations of state behavior.
The purpose of this Article is to explore international legal education as an additional determinant of the efficacy of international law. I make two basic claims. First,
the study of international law varies widely among different parts of the world. Conducting a global survey of curricula at thousands of law schools in over 190 countries, I reveal drastic fluctuations in the pervasiveness of international legal training
among national jurisdictions. In some countries, all students must study international
law prior to joining the legal profession, in others training is optional, and in still
others it is simply unavailable. These findings dovetail with other research suggesting that training also varies cross-nationally in terms of its quality, topical emphases,
and ideological orientation. Together, the evidence suggests that the world’s lawyers
learn about international norms in considerably different ways and to wildly different
extents.
As legal systems go, such conditions are aberrational. A U.S. analogy would be
mandatory and ideologically supportive training in federal constitutional law for all
lawyers in California and Oregon, with perhaps a heavy emphasis on federalism in
California and the First Amendment in Oregon; optional and cursory training on the
subject for lawyers in Texas; no exposure for any lawyers in New York; mandatory
coverage in Kansas with an unwaveringly communist ideological bent; and pervasive
training in Indiana from an Islamic perspective. While variation in the domestic context is not altogether absent,10 international law curricula diverge globally to a much
greater degree because international governing bodies lack authority to standardize
coursework, the professional networks that contribute to the homogeneity of training
within a state are much weaker across borders,11 cross-national disparities in wealth
generate varying levels of educational resources,12 and major legal traditions tend to
approach university instruction in different ways.13
The second claim is that current training conditions around the world are likely to
inhibit materially the efficacy of international law. To state the idea as a hypothetical,
imagine two countries. In the first, law schools establish multiple courses on international law as compulsory for all students, ensure that the courses encourage rigorous analysis, and generally frame the discipline in a positive way. Over time, the

9. Cf. U.N. Secretary General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Rep.
of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶¶ 244–60 U.N. Doc. A/59/565
(2004) (suggesting that Security Council reform is needed to preserve the institution’s
legitimacy).
10. Harvard Law School, for example, does not require students to take a course on U.S.
constitutional law. See Requirements for the J.D. Degree, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/academics/handbook/rules-relating-to-law-school-studies/requirements
-for-the-j-d-degree/ [https://perma.cc/2CKV-PUTE].
11. Cf. Christopher P.M. Waters, Reconceptualizing Legal Education After War, 101 AM.
J. INT’L L. 382, 396–403 (2007) (documenting U.N. and civil society efforts to encourage domestic training on international law).
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part I.C; see also Jens Beckert, Institutional Isomorphism Revisited: Convergence and Divergence in Institutional Change, 28 SOC. THEORY 150 (2010) (identifying
causes of variation).
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result is an entire generation of lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and other professionals
who are aware of the relevant issues, proficient in doctrinal basics, and accustomed
to a pro-compliance message. In the second, training is uncommon or overtly hostile
toward international law. Would the foreign policies of these states differ? More precisely, would domestic training features render international law more effective in
the first state than in the second, all else equal? Drawing on empirical work from the
fields of social psychology and political science, I argue that there are compelling
reasons to believe they would. The central thesis—what I will call the “training thesis”—is that domestic approaches to the study of international law plausibly influence the efficacy of international obligations within and among states, with norm
awareness, utilization, and even compliance rates faring better to the extent that the
study of international law is pervasive, rigorous, and supportive, and suffering to the
extent that study is limited, poor in quality, or critical. A corollary is that crossnational commonalities in training are likely to facilitate amicable foreign relations
by helping states to settle upon shared understandings of lawful conduct, while crossnational divergences likely have the opposite effect. These dynamics would suggest
that pervasive global disparities in the study of international law are a compliance
problem.
A couple of premises undergird this claim. One is that formal education is capable
of ionizing students to act in accordance with views that the state, university, and
faculty have chosen to privilege within the curriculum. The source of this capacity is
that effective training can socialize its recipients to internalize the privileged views.
Opinions differ on the desirability of this phenomenon,14 but everyone from U.S.
Supreme Court Justices15 to Pink Floyd16 understands intuitively that it happens.
More importantly, an extensive literature on political socialization has corroborated
the popular intuition across a range of educational contexts and cultures,17 and studies in social psychology have identified the underlying causal mechanism as persuasion.18 As I will demonstrate, there is reason to believe that this mechanism also operates in international legal education, and that training-induced attitudes about
international law manifest as individual behaviors of support or disregard for the discipline once graduates enter their professions. Law schools may thus operate as portals through which attitudes about international norms—whether positive or negative—diffuse domestically.19

14. See, e.g., IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (1971) (critiquing institutionalized
education).
15. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 437 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Our cases have consistently recognized the importance of education to the professional and personal development of the individual.”).
16. PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall (Part II), on THE WALL (Columbia 1979) (“We
don’t need no education, we don’t need no thought control.”). In the same spirit, see GEORGE
ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM (1946), in which a little pig uses education to persuade the other animals to expel Mr. Jones from Manor Farm and, later, uses it to subjugate them.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. Cf. Margaret E. McGuinness, Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration
of International Human Rights, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 760 (2006) (defining norm por-
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The other premise is that graduates persuaded toward support or disregard of
international law are capable of influencing state action as professionals, especially
in the aggregate. For example, some will become prosecutors, judges, or foreign
policy elites with direct control over compliance decisions. Others will join interest
groups or NGOs that pressure government actors to adopt or reject policies of
obedience. Some will encounter opportunities to utilize or argue against global norms
in the course of private practice. And as authoritative expositors of the law in
domestic media, some will exert influence over public discourse and, in turn, popular
attitudes about the legitimacy of international law. In summary, legal education can
spur lawyers to act in conformity with privileged views about international law, and
these professionals can in turn shape state behavior. On this logic, significant global
variations in the study of international law generate kaleidoscopic perceptions on the
contours and normative weight of the field, along with attendant effects on state
policy.
The training thesis accepts that the international order is in one sense anarchic
—the formal equality of functionally undifferentiated sovereign states ensures a
general absence of legal authority to coerce.20 Indeed, the absence of a supranational
government with authority to mandate a single curriculum is probably a major
contributor to the diversity of national approaches to international legal training.21
But this condition does not dictate any particular view within states about the binding
character or value of international law. Centralized enforcement is not a sine qua non
of legal order.22 Insofar as universities play a critical role in shaping how the legal
profession around the world perceives international law and the profession in turn
shapes state behavior, these institutions influence compliance. To adapt Alexander
Wendt’s famous dictum, anarchy is in part what law schools make of it.23
This argument draws upon sociological institutionalist and constructivist insights
from an extensive literature on law and international relations theory. Particularly
germane is the scholarship of Jeffrey Checkel, who traces the process by which transnational socialization mechanisms interact with domestic political structures to generate varying levels of norm compliance.24 Like Checkel’s work, the training thesis

tals as “horizontal gateway[s] that allow[], through a formal procedural mechanism or substantive right, the importation of external norms into a legal system”) (emphasis omitted).
20. Cf. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 102–16 (1979) (describing the conditions of anarchy).
21. See generally Ryan M. Scoville, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL
SURVEY, http://pilmap.org [https://perma.cc/Z498-KSQE] (reporting data on varying rates of
mandatory training in international law among states).
22. See, e.g., Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, International Law and Constructivism:
Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19,
65 (2000) (applying Lon Fuller’s interactional theory to suggest that the status of “law”
—international law in particular—does not depend on enforcement, but on “rhetorical activity
producing increasingly influential mutual expectations or shared understandings of actors”).
23. See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging
the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 473 (1997) [hereinafter Checkel,
International Norms and Domestic Politics]; Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learn-
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has an eclectic theoretical foundation that draws on multiple disciplines to identify
the chain of processes that produce compliance decisions.25 The point of departure
from his and other similar analyses is primarily chronological and venue-based. That
is, scholars often treat norm entrepreneurs,26 epistemic communities,27 government
elites,28 and domestic political coalitions as important variables in the compliance
equation, but either ignore where those actors obtained their attitudes or examine
socializing influences that arise relatively late in the game, once the key individuals
have already emerged as established professionals.29 I move the socialization inquiry
back in time by suggesting that many of the people who exert material influence over
state behavior obtained enduring orientations in favor of or against international law
from the university setting.
Most immediately, the argument suggests a research agenda for scholars. Studies
on the nature and significance of international legal education have been largely absent for decades, and this notwithstanding a voluminous literature on norms. By offering a theoretical account of the significance of law schools, the training thesis
helps to orient and structure future empirical work on the state of international legal
education around the world, the determinants of cross-national variation and commonality, and the consequences of difference. By assembling supportive evidence
from social psychology and political science, I hope to show that further study will
be worth the effort.
If true, the training thesis also carries practical implications for scholars, universities, and policymakers. It would help to explain why violations of international law
occur, why some states appear to adhere to their obligations more than others, and
why states at times hold fundamentally different views about international norms. It
would mean that the place of international law in the curriculum, and the particular
way in which professors go about teaching the subject, are compliance issues. More
concretely, it would support conclusions about specific states. For example, mapping

ing and European Identity Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553 (2001) [hereinafter Checkel, Why Comply?]; see also Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions,
Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT’L ORG. 185 (1994) (proposing a
similar framework).
25. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, 59 INT’L ORG. 801 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Amy Gurowitz, Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State, 51 WORLD POL. 413 (1999).
27. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1 (1992); Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, Courts
and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition Policies, 9 J. EUR. PUB.
POL’Y 913 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Richard Herrmann, The Power of Perceptions in Foreign-Policy Decision
Making: Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American Leaders?,
30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 841, 843 (1986).
29. Harold Koh’s theory of transnational legal process, for example, holds that international norms infiltrate domestic society when transnational agents interact to resolve contested
norms in law-declaring fora. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2645–58 (1997). I accept this view, but think it incomplete insofar
as it overlooks the possibility that the classroom is also an important “transmission belt”
through which norms infiltrate the domestic context.
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the theoretical argument onto the global survey data would suggest that the operative
systems of legal education in states like Austria and Sweden, where international law
training is pervasive and rigorous,30 materially contribute to compliance while the
systems of places like the United States and Pakistan, where such training is respectively uncommon and poor in quality, carry neutral or opposite effects.31 The argument would also suggest that states such as Belize and The Bahamas, which by agreement share a common system of legal education with other Caribbean nations,32 are
on balance more likely to act on the basis of compatible views about international
law in the course of executing their foreign policies. Finally, for law faculties and
national and international policymakers, confirmation of the training thesis would
establish that decisions about legal training requirements carry significant foreign
policy consequences over the long run.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I substantiates the claim that there are
significant global disparities in the study of international law. The Part conducts a
survey of thousands of universities in over 190 countries, reveals new data on crossnational variations in the extent to which individuals must study public international
law prior to completing a law degree, and then discusses accompanying differences
in educational quality, topical emphases, and ideological orientation. PILMap.org, a
website developed to accompany the Article, reports some of the findings in the form

30. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Austria, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/AT [https://perma.cc/TVL7-ELXV] (reporting
evidence that Austrian law requires domestic law schools to make public international law a
mandatory part of their curricula); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Sweden, WHO STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/SE [https://perma.cc
/WMG4-D4R8] (reporting that all Swedish law schools require students to complete a course
on public international law).
31. AHMED ALI KHAN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN: A REVIEW 1, http://www
.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/articles/6/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/58D3-VDBY] (“Legal Education
in Pakistan is in a colossal mess at all levels.”); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: United States,
WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/US
[https://perma.cc/YK9W-SDAB] (reporting that only approximately four percent of U.S. law
schools require a course concerning public international law).
32. See Agreement Establishing the Council of Legal Education (1970), CARIBBEAN
COMMUNITY SECRETARIAT (1970), http://archive.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments
/agreement_cle.jsp?menu=secretariat [https://perma.cc/GS9Q-9SFY]. The Agreement provides that any LLB graduates of the University of the West Indies, and any Guyanese nationals
who are LLB graduates from the University of Guyana, are entitled to automatic admission to
any of three regional law schools—Norman Manley Law School in Jamaica, Hugh Wooding
Law School in Trinidad and Tobago, and Eugene Dupuch Law School in The Bahamas. See
id. at Art. 3. Graduates from these schools are in turn qualified to practice law in jurisdictions
throughout the Caribbean. Id. at Art. 4–5. Several states in the South Pacific have created a
similar arrangement. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Fiji, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL
LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/FJ [https://perma.cc/ALY8-TXBN] (Fiji);
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Papua New Guinea, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/PG [https://perma.cc/6A6X-7GHH] (Papua New
Guinea); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Solomon Islands, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/SB [https://perma.cc/HA3P-63JS] (Solomon
Islands); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Vanuatu, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/VU [https://perma.cc/5HZQ-L556] (Vanuatu).
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of an interactive world map.33 This evidence distinguishes the study of international
law from the study of municipal law, which tends to be highly homogeneous within
the jurisdiction to which it pertains.
The rest of the Article elaborates on the processes by which the global disparities
identified in Part I might translate into state behavior. Part II justifies the view that
legal education can mold its recipients. Using experimental evidence from social
psychology, I contend that training in international law is capable of persuading students to view the discipline in ways that law faculties have chosen to privilege, the
result of which is classes of graduates who are likely to act in support or disregard of
international norms as professionals, depending on the nature of the instruction they
received. Part III in turn justifies the view that these professionals can be sufficiently
influential to align state policy with classroom orthodoxy. Using a diverse set of
scholarship from political science, I argue that individuals with legal training are
often well positioned to shape state behavior as government elites, activists, private
practitioners, and experts, but also that national political structures are likely to mediate the types of professionals who will matter most. Part IV expounds upon the
thesis’s merits and implications.
To be clear, my purpose is primarily descriptive rather than normative. I assume
that effective international law is desirable, but that assumption is not necessary to
the argument. Thus, for readers who hold different normative priors, the training thesis is still significant; all that changes are the implications.
I. GLOBAL VARIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EDUCATION
Contemporary doctrine holds that international law is universal—it generally applies in the same way across the entire globe, regardless of culture, nationality, and
history.34 The study of the discipline, however, is highly variegated in the sense that
there are wide cross-national variations in the pervasiveness, quality, topical emphases, and ideological orientation of university instruction. This Part reveals these differences by conducting the most extensive global survey on the study of international
law to date, and by highlighting relevant research from the fields of comparative
international law and law and development.
A. Pervasiveness
To identify global study patterns, I conducted a survey in 2014 on the frequency
with which law schools and governments around the world require law students to
complete a course on public international law.35 To collect the data, I relied on a
combination of official government documents, information available on the
websites of thousands of university law faculties, and, occasionally, email

33. Scoville, supra note 21.
34. Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475 (2010).
35. By “law degree,” I mean the principal university degree that students complete prior
to entering legal practice. In many countries, this is an LLB or a JD. The definition excludes
LLMs, PhDs, and non-law undergraduate degrees that may be prerequisites to enrollment in a
JD or JD-equivalent program.
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correspondence with faculty members. Where this evidence established that a
curriculum includes a mandatory course on “public international law,” “international
law,” “international human rights law,” or any other topic that on its face
substantially implicates public international law,36 I coded the corresponding
university as requiring international legal training. Inversely, I coded a university as
requiring no such training where the evidence demonstrated that courses on public
international law are elective or unavailable. Finally, I coded a university as “no data”
if it has a law faculty but evidence of its curriculum was inaccessible within the
confines of the research methods. The results are available at PILMap.org in the form
of an interactive map that allows users to examine summary statistics and details
about the curricula of specific law schools within each national jurisdiction.37
Assuming that 2014 is generally representative of prior and subsequent years, the
survey results are noteworthy in several respects. First, they illuminate the minimum
amount of training that occurs among law students in a majority of states. They establish, for example, that at least one-third of law students in Australia take a course
on international law, and that at least four percent of American students do so, along
with at least forty percent of Saudi students and all Indian students.38 The emphasis
here is on minimum levels of training because the survey does not take into account
elective courses or those completed for advanced law degrees, such as LLMs and
JSDs. In countries where relevant electives or additional degrees are popular, the
actual percentage of students who have completed some form of international law
course will likely hover well above the reported percentage.39 This fact limits the
data’s usefulness for comparisons of states with similar compulsory training rates,
but still permits comparisons between the poles. For instance, given a compulsory
training rate of 100% in Brazil and 0% in Japan, it is likely that Brazilian law students
study international law at a much higher rate than their Japanese counterparts.40
Second, the survey establishes that compulsory education in international law is
widespread, but also far from universal. It is common on all continents, particularly

36. For example, I did not count evidence of a required course on private international
law, the law of the European Union, or comparative law. I did, however, count “transnational
law” courses that incorporate public international law.
37. Scoville, supra note 21.
38. See Scoville, supra note 21 (reporting national percentages).
39. From conversations with colleagues who are knowledgeable about international law
teaching in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, I have the sense that international law is a more popular elective in those countries than it has been in the United States.
Cf. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in U.S. Law Schools: Plenty of Offerings, But Too Few Students, 31 INT’L LAW. 845, 854 (1997) (suggesting that student enrollment in international law courses has been low for decades); Charlotte Ku & Christopher J.
Borgen, American Lawyers and International Competence, 18 DICKINSON J. INT’L L. 493,
502–03 (2000) (describing how enrollment rates in international law courses in the United
States have historically been low).
40. Compare Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Brazil, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/BR [https://perma.cc/QSG9-M5EY] (reporting
that all Brazilian law schools require a course on public international law), with Ryan M.
Scoville, Country: Japan, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY,
http://pilmap.org/Details/JP [https://perma.cc/LK7Z-UXCZ] (reporting that no Japanese law
schools require a course on the subject).
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Africa, Asia, and South America.41 In this sense, it is not a peculiarity of the
European lawyer, as the stereotype seems to hold, but standard for a majority of law
graduates around the world. Indeed, there are many states in which every single law
student must take at least one international law course.42 Table 1 aggregates these
results by reporting the percentage of law schools on each continent that mandate
training on public international law. Table 2 in turn shows the average rate of compulsory training among states on each continent. The results recall earlier research
by world society theorists, who have found cross-national similarities in a host of
organizational domains, including education,43 and Duncan Kennedy’s work on the
globalization of legal thought.44
Features of the survey methodology suggest that the results are, if anything, likely
to understate the amount of training that is taking place. One reason is that the map
codes universities as not requiring international legal education if they offer multiple
forms of a basic law degree and even just one of those forms omits a compulsory
international course.45 Another is that the map does not account for electives, or for
training that professors might incorporate into courses with titles that appear
unrelated to the topic. Still another reason is that the map numbers do not reflect
sources of non-university training, such as bar examinations and post-graduate
programs for future judges and prosecutors, which appear to be fairly common. In
Europe, for example, the bar exams of Albania, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

41. See Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Map of Africa, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL
LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps?map=africa_en [https://perma
.cc/P4V5-XF36] (Africa); Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Map of South America, WHO
STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps?map
=south_america_en [https://perma.cc/6D9F-J8TF] (South America).
42. See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Brazil, supra note 40; Ryan M. Scoville,
Country: Ethiopia, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org
/Details/ET [https://perma.cc/4T3D-RFZV] (Ethiopia); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: India,
WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/IN [https://
perma.cc/Y5MV-BFHE] (India).
43. See, e.g., DAVID JOHN FRANK & JAY GABLER, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNIVERSITY:
WORLDWIDE SHIFTS IN ACADEMIA IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2006) (reporting cross-national similarities in university curricula across a range of disciplines); John W. Meyer, Francisco O.
Ramirez & Yasemin Nuhoḡlu Soysal, World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870–1980, 65
SOC. EDUC. 128 (1992) (discussing evidence of global isomorphism in the provision of mass
schooling).
44. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19 (David M. Trubek
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
45. This was an issue for some law schools in countries with mixed legal traditions, like
Canada and Saudi Arabia. In Canada, the use of civil law in Quebec and common law elsewhere has led some schools to offer separate degrees for civil and common law practitioners.
In these cases, it is typical for only the civil law degree to include a mandatory course on
international law. Universities in Saudi Arabia have dealt with the coexistence of secular and
Sharia law in similar fashion by requiring study in international law only for secular degree
candidates. Because it is possible for law students at these universities to avoid international
law by opting for a common or Sharia law degree, I coded the institutions as not requiring
international legal training.

2017]

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL SCHOOLS

1459

Table 1. Aggregate compulsory training rates46
Continent
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
Oceania
South America

Aggregate Rate
88%
92%
70%
43%
30%
99%

Table 2. Average compulsory training rates
Continent
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
Oceania
South America

Average Rate
84%
82%
85%
90%
11%
99%

Finland, France, and Lithuania, among others, all covered international law in
2014,47 while countries such as Albania and the Czech Republic also incorporated
international law into specialized judicial training.48
Combined with population statistics from the World Bank49 and UNESCO data
on the annual number of university graduates in law from an assortment of national
jurisdictions,50 the PILMap.org results also make it possible to develop a baseline
measure of international legal norm diffusion. Specifically, multiplying the number
of law graduates for a given country and year by the corresponding rate of compulsory training in international law, and then dividing by the country’s total population
for that year reveals the minimum number of new law graduates per capita who have

46. The numbers for Tables 1 and 2 were calculated based on the curricular information
reported at PILMap.org. See Scoville, supra note 21.
47. See Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Map of Europe, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL
LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps?map=europe_en [https://perma
.cc/C9LL-3LXH] (data on European states).
48. See, e.g., Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Albania, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/AL [https://perma.cc/2X96-X55F] (Albania);
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Czech Republic, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL
SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/CZ [https://perma.cc/D7Z8-FMBY] (Czech Republic).
49. Data: Population, Total, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP
.POP.TOTL [https://perma.cc/4AVG-LHTS].
50. UNESCO Inst. for Statistics, Tertiary-Level Enrollment in Law Programmes and the
Number of Tertiary-Level Graduates from Law Programmes by Country, 2009–2013 (Feb.
19, 2016) (unpublished spreadsheet on file with the Indiana Law Journal). I obtained this data
through email correspondence with a researcher at the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. E-mail
from Chiao-Ling Chien, Researcher, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, to Ryan M. Scoville,
Assoc. Professor of Law, Marquette Univ. Law Sch. (Feb. 19, 2016, 11:03 AM) (e-mail on
file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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completed at least one course on public international law. The results of this calculation suggest extreme variation in the pervasiveness of international legal
knowledge among national populations. In 2012 in Lithuania, for example, slightly
over 3100 individuals graduated with a law degree, and all of them appear to have
completed at least one course on public international law.51 Given a national population of approximately 2.9 million,52 3100 people is equivalent to approximately one
new graduate with international legal training for every thousand Lithuanian residents. In the same year in Ghana, by contrast, the number was five hundred times
smaller at approximately one in five hundred thousand. Table 3 reports these data for
2012 for a select number of countries.53
Table 3. Number of 2012 graduates in law who completed at least one compulsory course on
public international law
Country

Number of Graduates
(Per Pop. of 500,000)

Country

Number of Graduates
(Per Pop. of 500,000)

Lithuania

522

Austria

130

Estonia
Brazil

260
242

Bulgaria
Sweden

120
108

Croatia

231

Greece

104

Denmark

192

Finland

99

Colombia

187

Norway

97

Iran

170

Guyana

29

Luxembourg
Tunisia

167
160

Lesotho
Qatar

9
7

Czech Republic

151

United States

4

Belgium

132

Ghana

1

Viewed in light of prior research, the PILMap.org results also suggest a trajectory
in global practice. In 1967 and 1973, René-Jean Dupuy and his coauthors published
surveys of training requirements across a selection of states, including on the extent
to which international law is a compulsory subject of study.54 Table 4 compares the
results of those surveys with my own.

51. UNESCO Inst. For Statistics, supra note 50.
52. Data: Population, Total, supra note 49.
53. The table focuses on 2012 because that is the most recent year for which the UNESCO
data is available, and reports only those countries for which there was both UNESCO and
PILMap.org data. Importantly, for the minority of Table 3 countries whose compulsory training rates fell somewhere between 0% and 100% (Belgium, Ghana, and the United States), the
accuracy of the data assumes that the graduating classes were roughly the same size across
different universities—an assumption that may not hold true. The data also assume that compulsory training rates did not change materially from 2012 to the date of the PILMap.org survey in 2014.
54. RENÉ-JEAN DUPUY, THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES: INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1967); RENÉ JEAN DUPUY & GREGORY TUNKIN, COMPARABILITY OF DEGREES AND DIPLOMAS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A STUDY ON THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS (1973).
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Table 4. Compulsory training in international law: Historical comparison of national
percentages
Country

1967

Bulgaria

—

1973

2014

100%

100%

Denmark
Egypt

0%
100%

0%
100%

100%
100%55

Finland

100%

100%

100%

France56

100%

100%

54%

0%

47% (Germany)

Hungary

100%

100%

100%

India
Italy

~50%
100%

~50%
100%

99%
³95%

West Germany

—

Japan
“Latin America”57
Nigeria
Norway
Romania
Sri Lanka
Sweden
UK60
USA

0%

0%

0%

100%

100%

99%58

0%

0%

0%59

0%
—
—
0%
48%
“Very few”

0%

100%

100%
0%

³74%
³50%

0%

100%

—

3%

“Very few”

4%

USSR

100%

100%

100% (Russia)

Yugoslavia

100%

100%

³77% (successor states)

55. This figure is tentative. All Egyptian universities that published their training requirements reported that students must take a course on international law, but such reports were not
always available.
56. French universities first introduced international law as a compulsory subject in 1889.
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 31 (2001). “The situation was not very different in other
continental States.” Id.
57. The prior surveys did not identify the specific Latin American countries they included.
58. This figure is tentative because curricular information is not available for a handful of
universities in Latin America.
59. This figure is also tentative, given the limited availability of curricular information
for some universities in Nigeria.
60. In England, the “first chairs of international law proper were set up . . . in Oxford in
1859 . . . and in Cambridge in 1866,” but it does not appear that any international law courses
at these universities were compulsory during this early period. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 56,
at 33; see also MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: TEACHINGS AND
TEACHING 165–66 (2d rev. ed. 1987) (explaining that even by the late 1800s, international law
was “not taught at a considerable number of European universities,” and that even where the
subject was taught, the “number of courses was very modest (one in general, during one semester, for a few hours per week)”).
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The comparison shows that most of the significant change in the surveyed states
has been in the direction of more international legal training. Law schools in
Scandinavian states did not require their students to study international law in the
1960s and 1970s, but do so now. Only 50% of Indian law schools mandated an international course up through 1973, but nearly 100% have the requirement today.
Germany and Sri Lanka appear to have experienced shifts of similar magnitude.
The notion of a global trend toward international training is consistent with a more
recent survey by John King Gamble, who in the early 1990s collected responses to
questionnaires that he sent to “members of the American Society of International
Law living outside the U.S. and Canada who had indicated in the Society’s membership records that a major portion of their work involved the teaching of international
law.”61 With responses from 150 professors in thirty different countries, most of
which were European, Gamble reported that “an introductory course in public international law [was] required for the first law degree” at 66% of universities.62 While
methodological differences63 between our surveys preclude any firm conclusions, it
appears, based on the available data, that compulsory study rates have increased since
the date of Gamble’s survey. As reported in Table 2,64 the PILMap.org data show not
only that the aggregate rate of compulsory training is now 70% in Europe, but also
that rates are even higher on a majority of the other continents.
Even in countries where international law is typically an elective, there is evidence of a significant expansion in the number and variety of international course
offerings since the mid-twentieth century. Consider the United States: A survey from
1907 found that while ten schools—Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Cornell, Chicago,
Indiana, Iowa, George Washington, John Marshall, and Washington University
—offered an elective, “[m]any of the lesser schools and most of the Western schools
omit[ted] international law.”65 This state of affairs persisted for quite some time.
Manley Hudson complained in 1929 that law schools had “neglect[ed] the subject”
for the past “several decades,”66 and in 1938 only 22 of 84 Association of American
Law Schools (AALS) member schools offered even one course on the subject.67 But

61. JOHN KING GAMBLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990S, at 68 (1993).
62. Id. at 68, 77–78.
63. The present survey differs from Gamble’s in several respects, aside from its date.
First, it is more global in the sense that it includes data on almost all states. Second, it does not
focus exclusively on whether foreign educational institutions require courses on public international law; it also reflects whether foreign law requires such courses. And third, the present
survey relies on different research methods. Rather than depend on responses to questionnaires, I tapped virtually every source I could imagine, with a particular emphasis on the curricular materials that are available on law school websites.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
65. Charles Noble Gregory, The Study of International Law in Law Schools, 2 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 41, 45 (1907); see also John M. Raymond & Barbara J. Frischholz, Lawyers Who
Established International Law in the United States, 1776–1914, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 802,
815–17 (1982) (discussing the introduction of international law into American legal education
in the nineteenth century).
66. Manley O. Hudson, The Teaching of International Law in America, 15 A.B.A. J. 19,
22 (1929).
67. Manley O. Hudson, Twelve Casebooks on International Law, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 447,
456 (1938).
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international electives expanded steadily after World War II. By 1947, the number
of schools with an elective in international law had increased to 30.68 That number
soon grew to 55, or 51% of AALS member schools, by 1953;69 91, or 68% of schools,
by 1964;70 and 117, or 78% of schools, by 1974.71 At this point, moreover, it was not
uncommon to see multiple offerings—32% of schools had three or more electives in
international legal studies by the mid-1960s.72 Reported contributors to this shift include the publication of new teaching materials, an increase in the number of law
professors who were qualified to teach the subject, financial support from the Ford
Foundation, and a growing student belief in the utility of international training.73
The postwar trend continued into more recent decades. By 1991, John King
Gamble was able to report that 98% of American schools offered at least one course
on international law.74 By 1997, roughly 90% had 5 or more international offerings.75
A 2004 American Bar Association (ABA) survey documented a “noted increase[]”
in international electives during the 1990s, with 33 schools now making available not
only an introductory course, but specialization certificates as well.76
Although it is uncertain whether the United Nations played a role, the expansion
of international legal education over the second half of the twentieth century occurred
alongside a litany of supportive resolutions from the UN General Assembly. In the
first of these, adopted in 1947, the General Assembly resolved “to request the
Governments of Member States . . . [t]o take appropriate measures to extend the
teaching of international law in all its phases . . . in the universities and higher educational institutions of each country that are under government control . . . or to initiate such teaching where it is not yet provided.”77 Subsequent resolutions reaffirmed
this request with more forceful language: The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights proclaimed as one of its core purposes that “every individual and every organ

68. Philip W. Thayer, The Teaching of International and Comparative Law, 1 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 449, 449 (1949).
69. Wm. W. Bishop, Jr., International Law in American Law Schools Today, 47 AM. J.
INT’L L. 686, 687 (1953).
70. RICHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES: A SURVEY OF TEACHING
IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS 1963–1964, at 3, 32 (1965).
71. MICHAEL H. CARDOZO, THE PRACTICAL STATE OF TEACHING AND RESEARCH IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1974, at 29, 42 (1977). The utility of comparing these surveys assumes
that they employed identical or at least similar methodologies.
72. See EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 3, 5.
73. See, e.g., id. at 11, 34 (discussing growing student and faculty interest in international
law); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford
Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447,
450 (2004) (discussing the role of the Ford Foundation).
74. GAMBLE, supra note 61, at 121.
75. John A. Barrett, Jr., International Legal Education in the United States: Being Educated for Domestic Practice While Living in a Global Society, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y
975, 992 (1997).
76. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, A SURVEY OF
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: 1992–2002, at 7, 32 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/1992_2002_survey_of_law_school_curricula
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LDU-U6YU].
77. G.A. Res. 176 (II), ¶ 1 (Nov. 21, 1947).

1464

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 92:1449

of society . . . shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect” for its enumerated rights and freedoms.78 In 1962, the General Assembly “[u]rge[d] Member
States to undertake broad programmes of training . . . in the field of international
law.”79 From 1970 to 1990, a string of ten resolutions repeatedly “[u]rge[d] all
Governments to encourage the inclusion of courses on international law in the programmes of legal studies offered at institutions of higher learning.”80 In 1989, the
General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the 1990s the “United Nations
Decade of International Law,” one of the primary goals of which was to “encourage
the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law.”81
Subsequent resolutions from 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999 “[u]rge[d] all
States . . . to make all possible efforts to implement th[is] goal[],”82 and a resolution
from 1992 invited states to “encourage their educational institutions to introduce
courses in international law for students studying law, political science, social sciences and other relevant disciplines.”83
The postwar expansion also occurred alongside the adoption of a handful of multilateral treaties that explicitly call upon states to educate national publics on treaty
norms, particularly in the areas of human rights law and international humanitarian
law. Parties to the Geneva Conventions, for instance, “undertake . . . to disseminate
the text of [the Conventions] as widely as possible in their respective countries, and,
in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire
population.”84 Likewise, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights imposes
on state parties “the duty to promote and ensure through teaching, education and
publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained in the [Charter] and to
see to it that these freedoms and rights as well as corresponding obligations and
duties are understood.”85 Comparable provisions are also present in the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,86 the

78. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 72 (Dec. 10, 1948).
79. G.A. Res. 1816 (XVII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 1962).
80. G.A. Res. 44/28, ¶ 9 (Dec. 4, 1989); G.A. Res. 42/148, ¶ 9 (Dec. 7, 1987); G.A. Res.
40/66, ¶ 8 (Dec. 11, 1985); G.A. Res. 38/129, ¶ 8 (Dec. 19, 1983); G.A. Res. 36/108, ¶ 8 (Dec.
10, 1981); G.A. Res. 34/144, ¶ 8 (Dec. 17, 1979); G.A. Res. 32/146, ¶ 6 (Dec. 16, 1977); G.A.
Res. 3502 (XXX), ¶ 6 (Dec. 15, 1975); G.A. Res. 3106 (XXVIII), ¶ 5 (Dec. 12, 1973); G.A.
Res. 2838 (XXVI), ¶ 6 (Dec. 18, 1971).
81. G.A. Res. 44/23, ¶¶ 1–2 (Nov. 17, 1989).
82. G.A. Res. 54/102, ¶ 12 (Dec. 9, 1999); G.A. Res. 52/152, ¶ 13 (Dec. 15, 1997); G.A.
Res. 50/43, ¶ 12 (Dec. 11, 1995); G.A. Res. 48/29, ¶ 13 (Dec. 9, 1993); G.A. Res. 46/50, ¶ 13
(Dec. 9, 1991).
83. G.A. Res. 47/32, annex ¶ IV(2) (Nov. 25, 1992).
84. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field art. 47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
85. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 25, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58.
86. G.A. Res. 61/177, annex, International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, art. 23(1) (Dec. 20, 2006) (“Each State Party shall ensure that
the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials
and other persons who may be involved in the custody or treatment of any person deprived of
liberty includes the necessary education and information regarding the relevant provisions of
this Convention . . . .”).
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Convention Against Torture,87 and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions,88 among various other treaties. These agreements impose obligations
on states rather than universities, but may have spurred some governments to include
international law as a compulsory subject of study in municipal laws that regulate
the content of legal training. By helping to normalize the idea of international legal
education, the agreements may have also inspired some universities to mandate pertinent courses on their own initiative.
But even given the historical trend, the survey data show that training in international law remains far from universal. Some states that suffer from severe poverty
and instability, such as the Central African Republic and South Sudan, do not appear
to have functioning law schools, much less compulsory training on international
norms.89 As Table 5 illustrates, law schools in developed states, such as Ireland,
Japan, and New Zealand, have chosen categorically not to require the study of international law.90 And in places like Australia, Canada, Ghana, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, mandatory training is not the majority practice.91 It is reasonable to assume comparatively low levels of exposure among graduates in these states.
Moreover, the percentage of university faculty members who work in the discipline
of law declined globally by roughly one-third over the course of the twentieth century, from 5.7% to 3.9%.92 This development raises the possibility that fewer university students now study international law, even if compulsory study has become more
common among those who do.

87. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 10(1), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85.
88. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 83(1), adopted June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (“The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of
armed conflict, to disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their
respective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of
military instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the civilian population, so that those
instruments may become known to the armed forces and to the civilian population.”).
89. See Scoville, Continental Map of Africa, supra note 41 (data on African states).
90. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Ireland, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/IE [https://perma.cc/T2FK-ATNV] (Ireland);
Scoville, Country: Japan, supra note 40 (Japan); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: New Zealand,
WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/NZ
[https://perma.cc/5WUH-ZUNV] (New Zealand).
91. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Australia, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/AU [https://perma.cc/B7S4-XBC3] (Australia);
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Canada, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY,
http://pilmap.org/Details/CA [https://perma.cc/FZN5-F6P9] (Canada); Ryan M. Scoville,
Country: United Kingdom, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY,
http://pilmap.org/Details/GB [https://perma.cc/7C7S-JA2G] (United Kingdom); Scoville,
supra note 31 (United States).
92. FRANK & GABLER, supra note 43, at 68–69.
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Table 5. Lowest rates of compulsory study93
Country
Ireland
Japan
New Zealand
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
United Kingdom
South Korea
United States
Canada
Ghana

National Rate
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
3%
4%
4%
23%
25%

Finally, the map data raise questions about the etiological roots of cross-national
variation. Part of the explanation appears to lie in domestic law. To the extent that
there are rates of 100%, it is typically where a national government has adopted a
statute or regulation that obligates universities to teach international law as a mandatory course. This is the case in a number of major jurisdictions, including Brazil,
India, Pakistan, and Russia,94 although China has achieved a similarly high rate under
a law that merely recommends for the course to be mandatory.95 In contrast, rates
tend to be much lower in states where national regulation is absent.96
Differences in legal tradition might also play a role. Of the ten states with the
lowest rates of compulsory training, eight are common law jurisdictions.97 The correlation is not perfect—India, for example, mandates instruction98—but civil law jurisdictions appear more inclined to compel international training. The deeper questions of why only some states see the discipline as sufficiently important to include
in their national or subnational requirements, and why common law jurisdictions often choose not to prioritize international legal education, present intriguing avenues
for future research.
B. Quality
The study of international law also varies globally in the sense that there are vast
domestic and cross-national disparities in quality of instruction. On one end of the

93. I calculated these percentages based on the curricular data I reported at PILMap.org.
See Scoville, supra note 21.
94. See Scoville, Country: Brazil, supra note 40 (Brazil); Scoville, Country: India, supra
note 42 (India); Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Pakistan, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/PK [https://perma.cc/8YSJ-5VFC] (Pakistan);
Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Russia, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY,
http://pilmap.org/Details/RU [https://perma.cc/2V7A-BDW7] (Russia).
95. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: China, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/CN [https://perma.cc/C298-URH7].
96. See, e.g., Scoville, supra note 31 (reporting a compulsory training rate of 4% in the
United States, which does not have national curriculum requirements).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 55–60 (Table 4).
98. Scoville, Country: India, supra note 42.
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continuum are the usual elite suspects—the top schools in Europe, the United States,
and a few other places—that draw on vast financial resources, enjoy immensely
qualified faculties, use rigorous training techniques, and otherwise promote cultures
of scholarship and careful study. On the other end are a significant number of schools
in the developing world, some of which do not have substantial library collections,
functional facilities, full-time instructors, or casebooks in native languages.99 An entire genre of research and practice in law and development assumes that these conditions materially influence the rule of law at the national level.100 As I demonstrate
below, the training thesis lays bare the causal mechanics behind that assumption and
adapts them for an argument about the international rule of law.
C. Emphasis and Ideological Orientation
Finally, the study of international law is globally polymorphic in the sense that
there appears to be significant cross-national variation in the topics that courses tend
to emphasize and the ideological orientation with which instructors approach them.
Forthcoming research by Anthea Roberts reveals material differences among the major textbooks used in powerful states.101 While Russian textbooks often devote as
much attention to the law of outer space as they do to the law of international trade,
most American and British texts barely even mention the subject.102 Some of the
major Chinese offerings do not include any chapters on human rights.103 U.S.

99. See, e.g., RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM
INDEX FOR ARMENIA 2–3 (2007) (identifying some of these problems as common in Armenian
law schools); RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM INDEX
FOR MEXICO 2–3 (2011) (Mexico); Thomas F. Geraghty & Emmanuel K. Quansah, African
Legal Education: A Missed Opportunity and Suggestions for Change: A Call for Renewed
Attention to a Neglected Means of Securing Human Rights and Legal Predictability, 5 LOY.
U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 87, 90 (2007) (a number of African countries); Hikmahanto Juwana,
Legal Education Reform in Indonesia, 1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 6 (Indonesia); C. Raj Kumar,
Legal Education, Globalization, and Institutional Excellence: Challenges for the Rule of Law
and Access to Justice in India, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 221, 235 (2013) (India); Bui
Thi Bich Lien, Legal Education in Transitional Vietnam, in ASIAN SOCIALISM & LEGAL
CHANGE: THE DYNAMICS OF VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE REFORM 135 (John Gillespie & Pip
Nicholson eds., 2005) (Vietnam); Carl F. Minzner, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Legal
Education, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 335, 354–55 (2013) (China); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, The
Legal Clinic Is More Than a Sign on the Door: Transforming Law School Education in
Revolutionary Egypt, 5 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 39, 56–58 (2012) (Egypt). For a
general discussion of these issues, see Philip G. Altbach, Centers and Peripheries in the
Academic Profession: The Special Challenges of Developing Countries, in THE DECLINE OF
THE GURU: THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION IN DEVELOPING AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES 1
(Philip G. Altbach ed., 2003).
100. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & RONALD J. DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM AND
DEVELOPMENT: CHARTING THE FRAGILE PATH OF PROGRESS 279–306 (2008).
101. ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL?: A STUDY IN THE
GLOBALIZATION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at
80–152) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
102. Id. (manuscript at 121, 127).
103. See id. (manuscript at 122).
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casebooks cite to domestic law at a uniquely high rate.104 And depending on their
country of origin, casebooks appear to adopt different presentational strategies and
espouse divergent views on matters of doctrine. For instance, Chinese and Russian
textbooks tend to focus on the theory of international law, while Western texts
generally use case studies to emphasize practice and application.105 Chinese and
Russian texts also tend to be more critical of humanitarian intervention,106 and even
among Western sources there are dissimilar analytical frameworks for dealing with
extraterritorial jurisdiction.107
Other differences also seem likely. It would not be surprising, for example, if
third-world approaches to international law108 exert more substantial influence over
curricula in lesser-developed countries than in places like France and Japan, or if
Sharia law influences the content of education at universities in the Muslim world,
some of which offer both Sharia and secular degrees.109 Likewise, communism seems
to shape training in places like Vietnam, where curricula include mandatory courses
such as The Thought of Ho Chi Minh, Basic Principles of Marxism-Leninism, and
The Bourgeois Constitution.110
Researchers have also started to provide evidence of cross-national variation in
the educational and professional backgrounds of international law professors.
Roberts, for example, shows that academics in the United Kingdom are far more
likely to have studied their discipline at a foreign university than their counterparts
in Russia.111 Australian and British professors tend to publish more frequently in
journals with international editorial boards.112 And among scholars who reside and
teach within the global core, Russians and Americans are the most likely to have
entered the academy after working for their respective national governments.113
Americans also tend to have relatively little experience studying or practicing law
abroad, particularly outside of the West.114 The result is that there is not a single,

104. See id. (manuscript at 85).
105. Id. (manuscript at 86).
106. See id. (manuscript at 141–49).
107. See id. (manuscript at 149–52).
108. Cf. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE (Richard Falk,
Balakrishnan Rajagopal & Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2008) (collecting essays that “critically
explor[e] the past, present and future relevance of international law to the priorities of the
countries, peoples and regions of the . . . South”).
109. Compare, e.g., A Summary of the Study Plan for Undergraduate Department: Sharia,
JAZAN UNIVERSITY, https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/shariah-degree-curriculum
-jazan-university.pdf [https://perma.cc/G49R-E5ST] (curriculum for a degree in Sharia), with
A Summary of the Study Plan for Undergraduate Department: Law, JAZAN UNIVERSITY, https://
ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2017/05/law-degree-curriculum-jazan-university.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8GUF-567Z] (curriculum for a law degree).
110. See, e.g., Curriculum in Jurisprudence, Hue University, http://web.archive.org
/web/20140824235038/http://hueuni.edu.vn/portal/index.php/vi/chuongtrinhdaotao/detail/68
[https://perma.cc/7LP2-B2QS].
111. See ROBERTS, supra note 101 (manuscript at 165–67, 171–73).
112. See id. (manuscript at 182–88).
113. See id. (manuscript at 190–99).
114. See Ryan Scoville & Milan Markovic, How Cosmopolitan Are International Law Professors?, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 119, 131 (2016) (analyzing the professional backgrounds of
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invisible college of international lawyers, but a collection of “separate but overlapping epistemic communities, with different areas of expertise” and varying levels of
national orientation.115 This condition suggests that students of international law not
only learn about different issues to different degrees, but also receive instruction that
is informed by divergent perspectives on the nature and function of the discipline.
Training in municipal law within each state, by contrast, does not exhibit such
significant variation. In fact, law school curricula within a national jurisdiction often
appear to exhibit high levels of uniformity: faculties typically teach the same subjects, using the same vocabularies, authorities, theoretical frameworks, and even textbooks, and they do this on the basis of shared ideologies, similar professional backgrounds, and comparable resources. In part, such uniformity is government-imposed.
National regulations require all law schools in Brazil, for example, to teach compulsory courses on tax and labor law,116 and law schools in Slovenia to mandate courses
on criminal sentencing and the law of the European Union.117 In India, instruction
includes a compulsory class on environmental law.118 But intrajurisdictional uniformity also appears to be sociological and organic. For instance, many American
torts professors have gravitated toward the use of economic principles,119 and even
without a federal mandate, virtually all law schools across the United States teach a
compulsory course on federal constitutional law.120 These forms of national uniformity might have a number of sources, including the common professional socialization of scholars within a state, the dominance of only a single legal tradition within
most states, and evidence that wealth tends to be distributed more evenly within a
state than across the entire globe.121 For international law, these contributors to standardization are substantially absent.

international law professors at 150 American law schools).
115. ROBERTS, supra note 101 (manuscript at 37); see also Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner,
Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2011) (identifying
differences between American, Chinese, and European views of international law).
116. Portaria No. 1.886, 30.12.1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.], art. 6(II) (Braz.),
http://www.oab.org.br/arquivos/pdf/LegislacaoOab/LegislacaosobreEnsinoJuridico.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46P4-5BP9].
117. See Pravilnik o Zahtevanih Temeljnih Pravnih Znanjih Magistrov Prava za Sprejem
v Sodniško Pripravništvo, 93 Uradni List R.S. no. 93/2008 (Slovn.), http://www.uradni
-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=200893&stevilka=3942 [https://perma.cc/7TD2-F2C7] (listing curriculum requirements for the degree of magister prava).
118. BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA: PART IV, RULES OF LEGAL EDUCATION 23–24 (2008),
http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/BCIRulesPartIV.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U3TQ-UNQN].
119. See Daria Roithmayr, A Dangerous Supplement, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 80, 84 n.7 (2005).
120. See supra note 10 (noting that Harvard Law School does not require students to study
U.S. constitutional law).
121. Cf. RESEARCH INST., CREDIT SUISSE, GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 19 (2015),
https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=F2425415-DCA7-80B8-EAD
989AF9341D47E [https://perma.cc/9RUW-J37Y] (reporting that the top one percent of global
wealth holders owns half of all household assets in the world).
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II. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL TRAINING ON LAWYERS
Having established that cross-national variation exists, the next step is to theorize
on its significance. In the analysis that follows, I argue that the most likely process
by which global variations in legal education might affect the efficacy of international law is one of student persuasion.122 This process is essentially linear, beginning
when universities exert meaningful influence over the way in which future practitioners view international law, and culminating where personal views obtained from
the university setting manifest as individual behaviors of support or disregard for that
law once students enter their professions. Of course, this process can occur only
insofar as legal training communicates something about the discipline of international law, and only insofar as the operative message is sufficiently influential not
only to overcome contrary attitudes that students might carry with them into law
school, but also to generate new attitudes that persist over time and in the face of
countervailing influences that may arise in subsequent professional settings. This is
a tall order, and I am under no illusion that education always generates such transformative effects. At the same time, there is substantial evidence that formal training
can be a potent source of influence. One might even say that it is inevitable for universities to socialize students to internalize privileged views, given certain standard
features of the university environment. What is not inevitable is the direction and
degree of that influence, which depend heavily upon the particularities of the training
context, the chosen set of graduation requirements, and how those requirements are

122. To be clear, I do not contend that international legal education matters only because
it can persuade students. Law schools are academic institutions, but they are also social environments that can exert substantial pressure to conform to privileged views that students may
or may not privately accept. They are also suppliers of knowledge that students have material
incentives to exploit in law practice. Conceivably, these characteristics shape the efficacy of
international law in ways that have nothing to do with whether training can convince students
to view the discipline in privileged ways. Cf. RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING
STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013) (distinguishing
between persuasion, acculturation, and material inducement as forms of social influence). Students might, for example, temporarily espouse pro- or anti-international-law positions because
they perceive that doing so will bring social rewards in the form of faculty or peer approval.
Or they might closely study and later utilize what they learned in the classroom because doing
so will bring financial or other professional rewards. And it is possible that law schools socialize non-students. See generally John W. Meyer, The Effects of Education as an Institution,
83 AM. J. SOC. 55 (1977) (discussing how schools socialize both students and non-students by
sorting them into positions of higher or lower social status). I nevertheless focus on student
persuasion because I see it as the mechanism most likely to explain legal education’s possible
influence over the efficacy of international law. In particular, it is unclear how the acculturation that happens in law school could carry long-term significance, given that students are only
in that setting for a short period and will inevitably encounter new and potentially contrary
social environments as professionals. Moreover, the mere incentive to utilize knowledge acquired in the classroom tells us little about how graduates might do so—one could use doctrinal
knowledge to undermine international norms as much as to promote them. And non-student
socialization strikes me as a comparatively indirect source of influence, given that the students
who become lawyers are most centrally involved in the interpretation and utilization of
international law.
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implemented. This Part employs evidence on political socialization and social psychological studies on persuasion to suggest that the manner in which a law school,
university, or state decides to approach the issue of international legal training may
play a significant role in determining student views and, later, professional behavior
with respect to the subject.
A. The Evidence of Influence
Numerous studies on political socialization have tested the effects of postsecondary education on student attitudes and values. Simply put, much of this work
shows that education is influential. At a general level, a variety of longitudinal studies have found that undergraduates tend to adopt political identities that align with
the normative environment that predominates among faculty and peers.123 Other
studies have documented that academic majors affect student interests124 and that
college attendance generates statistically significant improvements in commitment
to civic involvement,125 racial and ethnic understanding,126 and gender egalitarianism,127 even after controlling for a range of variables. Similar dynamics also appear
to occur abroad128 and in professional and graduate schools.129 For example, one
study found that graduate-level training not only explained the professional role orientations of scientists and engineers employed at a major American aerospace
company, but also that subsequent experience in the workplace failed to change or
otherwise manipulate those orientations.130 Another reported that students’ career
preferences generally evolved to align with the faculty’s academic priorities131—students in research-oriented departments were more likely than counterparts in other
departments to shift toward research careers.132
More importantly, a handful of studies have suggested that legal education can
influence the values and political views of students.133 One reported anecdotal

123. E.g., ALEXANDER W. ASTIN, WHAT MATTERS IN COLLEGE? FOUR CRITICAL YEARS
REVISITED 150–59 (1993).
124. See JOHN C. SMART, KENNETH A. FELDMAN & CORINNA A. ETHINGTON, ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES: HOLLAND’S THEORY AND THE STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND FACULTY 139–71 (2000).
125. E.g., WILLIAM E. KNOX, PAUL LINDSAY & MARY N. KOLB, DOES COLLEGE MAKE A
DIFFERENCE? LONG-TERM CHANGES IN ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES 97 (1993).
126. E.g., Jeffrey F. Milem, College, Students, and Racial Understanding, 9 THOUGHT &
ACTION 51 (1994).
127. E.g., ASTIN, supra note 123, at 143.
128. See, e.g., Roderic A. Camp, University Environment and Socialization: The Case of
Mexican Politicians, 20 HIST. EDUC. Q. 313, 314 (1980).
129. See, e.g., D.A. Ondrack, Socialization in Professional Schools: A Comparative Study,
20 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 97, 101–02 (1975) (finding that nursing schools influenced the attitudes and
values of their students).
130. George A. Miller & L. Wesley Wager, Adult Socialization, Organizational Structure,
and Role Orientations, 16 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 151, 161 (1971).
131. David Gottlieb, Processes of Socialization in American Graduate Schools, in
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 258, 260–68 (Ronald M. Pavalko ed., 1968).
132. Id. at 264–65.
133. See James R. Elkins, Becoming a Lawyer: The Transformation of Self During Legal
Education, 66 SOUNDINGS 450, 451 (1983) (concluding that law school “significantly alters”
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evidence that a substantial portion of a sample of American legislators first became
interested in politics while in law school.134 A detailed case study on student
socialization at one elite school observed that “an identity formed by collective
eminence limits the occupational horizons of the great majority to one path of
achievement”—namely, employment at large corporate law firms in big cities.135
Still another revealed correlational evidence that law school alters legal orientations,
ideologies, and values.136
Equally significant, extensive research has established that particular university
courses can change student attitudes and behaviors. For example, statistical analyses
have consistently found strong evidence that the completion of even a single
women’s studies course can yield substantial and enduring improvements in student
views and behavior with respect to gender equality, openness to diversity, and involvement in social activism.137 One representative study conducted pre- and postcourse tests of two groups at a random sample of thirty-two universities, with one
group comprising students who enrolled in a women’s studies course and the other
comprising students who enrolled in a non-women’s studies course.138 Even after

student identity and experiences of the world); Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon,
Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Student
Orientations to Public Interest Concerns, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 11 (1978) (finding evidence
that law school exerts modest influence over student interests, values, and modes of thinking);
S.D. Ross, The Role of Lawyers in Society, AUSTRALIAN Q., Mar. 1976, at 61, 65–66 (relating
findings that law schools in Australia increase political liberalism among their students);
Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 681–84 (1973) (finding
that nearly half of those interviewed at Yale Law School reported change in their political
views during their first year); Wagner P. Thielens, Jr., The Influence of the Law School
Experience on the Professional Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 587 (1969) (finding
that the law school experience led students to internalize more ethical attitudes about
appropriate professional behavior); see also Leonard D. Eron & Robert S. Redmount, The
Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 443 (1957) (“[T]he selection of
legal training and the learning process itself are, in part, a psychological experience. It profoundly affects attitude formation and change, and, as such, influences the development of
professional role and professional practices.”); Samuel E. Wallace, Reference Group Behavior
in Occupational Role Socialization, 7 SOC. Q. 366 (1966) (finding that student aspirations to
gain acceptance into the legal profession cause them to adopt professional values).
134. Allan Kornberg & Norman Thomas, The Political Socialization of National Legislative Elites in the United States and Canada, 27 J. POL. 761, 771 (1965).
135. Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, Learning Collective Eminence: Harvard Law
School and the Social Production of Elite Lawyers, 33 SOC. Q. 503, 518 (1992); see also
Robert Granfield, Legal Education as Corporate Ideology: Student Adjustment to the Law
School Experience, 1 SOC. F. 514, 516–17 (1986) (finding that many students at an elite law
school gravitated toward “business/corporatist ideology” because of their law school
experience).
136. Gregory J. Rathjen, The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes and Values of Law Students, 44 TENN. L. REV. 85, 94 (1976).
137. Dozens of studies have reported similar findings. For a survey, see 2 ERNEST T.
PASCARELLA & PATRICK T. TERENZINI, HOW COLLEGE AFFECTS STUDENTS: A THIRD DECADE
OF RESEARCH 271–344 (2005).
138. See Jayne E. Stake & Frances L. Hoffmann, Changes in Student Social Attitudes, Activism, and Personal Confidence in Higher Education: The Role of Women’s Studies, 38 AM.
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controlling for variables such as class characteristics and pedagogical differences,
the researchers found that the students in the first group were significantly more
likely to demonstrate increases in egalitarian views on gender and likelihood of future activism.139 Likewise, courses on racial and ethnic diversity have been shown to
result in lower levels of prejudice and more concern for the promotion of racial understanding.140 Additional research has demonstrated the causal significance of
coursework on other topics for relevant attitudes and behaviors,141 and that the act of
taking multiple courses can produce cumulative effects.142 These effects appear to
persist over time,143 specifically depend on curricular content,144 and occur regardless
of both the level of initial student interest in the subject matter145 and the degree to
which students’ original views were consistent with the course’s normative
orientation.146
Perhaps even more relevant is a forthcoming study by Andrew Bell, who conducted a repeated cross-sectional survey of hundreds of freshman and senior cadets
at the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Army Reserve Officer Training Corps
(ROTC) to assess the influence of military training on cadets’ views regarding norms
of noncombatant immunity and the law of armed conflict.147 Bell found that training
effectively socialized cadets to be more sensitive toward the treatment of civilians in
wartime, and that the intensity of training correlated with the magnitude of the attitude change that occurred.148 Cadets at the Academy, who undergo more intensive
training than their ROTC counterparts, experienced a significant and more robust
shift in their views on principles of distinction, necessity, and proportionality.149
The premise of the training thesis is modest: law school courses on international
law are not inherently any less influential than the courses that existing scholarship

EDUC. RES. J. 411, 415–20 (2001).
139. See id. at 420–34.
140. These findings have also been widely replicated. See, e.g., Mitchell J. Chang, The
Impact of an Undergraduate Diversity Course Requirement on Students’ Racial Views and
Attitudes, 51 J. GEN. EDUC. 21, 35 (2002).
141. See, e.g., James R. Moran, Social Work Education and Students’ Humanistic Attitudes, 25 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 13 (1989).
142. Betsy Palmer, The Impact of Diversity Courses: Research from Pennsylvania State
University, DIVERSITY DIGEST (Winter 2000), http://diversityweb.org/digest/W00/research.html
[https://perma.cc/LH5H-X3AK].
143. See, e.g., Jayne E. Stake & Suzanna Rose, The Long-Term Impact of Women’s Studies
on Students’ Personal Lives and Political Activism, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 403, 410 (1994).
144. See id. at 404; Jayne E. Stake, Laurie Roades, Suzanna Rose, Lisa Ellis & Carolyn
West, The Women’s Studies Experience: Impetus for Feminist Activism, 18 PSCYHOL. WOMEN
Q. 17, 23 (1994).
145. See Stake & Hoffmann, supra note 138, at 431–32.
146. See Jeanne M. Sevelius & Jayne E. Stake, The Effects of Prior Attitudes and Attitude
Importance on Attitude Change and Class Impact in Women’s and Gender Studies, 33 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2341, 2342 (2003).
147. Andrew Bell, Can Military Training Change Combatant Norms? Comparing the
Effects of Ethics and Law of War Training at the U.S. Military Academy and Army ROTC
(Dec. 1, 2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
148. See id. (manuscript at 35–40).
149. Id. (manuscript at 38).

1474

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 92:1449

has already evaluated. Around the world, many future legal practitioners obtain their
training as undergraduates, just like the students involved in the research on women’s
studies and diversity courses.150 Others receive their legal training as graduate students, but it is not clear that the incremental differences in age and institutional context are material.151 Indeed, as I explain below, it is entirely plausible that training on
public international law is more effective, on balance, at socializing both undergraduate and graduate students than the other courses that have received primary
attention in the political socialization literature.152
To be sure, the existing evidence is not entirely uniform—some studies have
found that education does not generate attitude or value change,153 including in law
schools.154 For instance, a researcher who tested for changes in career interests, attitudes, and personality characteristics at one school concluded that the “marked stability . . . reflected in [the] data strongly indicate that law school graduates are generally law school freshman grown older.”155 Such studies suggest that international
legal training will not necessarily make a difference. But they also seem inadequate
to establish that specific training requirements are necessarily or even usually inconsequential. First, they are against the weight of the evidence showing that course
content matters.156 Second, most of them did not test the efficacy of purposeful
efforts to induce attitude change through the curriculum;157 for all we know, the law
schools under examination did not even attempt to influence students along the measured dimensions. Thus, the best conclusion seems to be that even limited amounts of
formal education are generally capable of shaping student attitudes. The next challenge is to explain why. In Part II.B., I undertake that project by identifying the classroom as an ideal setting for persuasion.
B. The Mechanism of Influence
Social psychological research on persuasion offers a framework for understanding
how even limited training can yield lasting effects. To explain, I employ the field’s
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which is an influential theory of persuasion

150. See supra text accompanying notes 137–40.
151. There is abundant evidence that socialization can occur well into adulthood. See
Jeylan T. Mortimer & Roberta G. Simmons, Adult Socialization, 4 ANN. REV. SOC. 421 (1978)
(surveying the literature on postchildhood socialization).
152. See infra text accompanying note 180.
153. See, e.g., Carol Copp, Scholarly Belief and Attitude Formation: The Case of the Radical Economics Paradigm, 25 SOC. FOCUS 121 (1992) (finding that postgraduate economics
programs do not alter the preexisting political identities of students); Albert Somit, Joseph
Tanenhaus, Walter H. Wilke & Rita W. Cooley, The Effect of the Introductory Political Science Course on Student Attitudes Toward Personal Political Participation, 52 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1129 (1958) (finding that introductory courses on political science did not produce significant attitude change among students on the issue of personal participation in politics).
154. See, e.g., Avrom Sherr & Julian Webb, Law Students, the External Market, and Socialization: Do We Make Them Turn to the City?, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 225, 228 (1989).
155. James E. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791, 865
(1979).
156. See supra text accompanying note 144.
157. See, e.g., Sherr & Webb, supra note 154, at 227–29.
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in the contemporary literature158 and has been found to explain persuasion across
disparate cultural contexts.159 The ELM proposes that people are generally motivated
to hold “correct” attitudes, but will use varying levels of cognitive effort to process
persuasive communications, depending on the circumstances.160 A person with a
strong motivation and ability to process a particular message is more likely to engage
a so-called “central” processing route that entails high levels of cognitive elaboration
on the merits of the arguments contained within the message.161 This might include,
for example, careful scrutiny of an argument’s internal logic or the strength of the
underlying evidence. But where the motivation or ability to process is limited, a person is likely to engage a “peripheral” route that entails lower levels of cognitive elaboration, such as reliance on heuristics or contextual cues that are unrelated to the
merits of the message. One person can simultaneously use both central and peripheral
routes, but there is a zero-sum relationship such that more extensive central processing necessarily entails less reliance on peripheral cues.162 For present purposes,
what is critical about the ELM is its suggestion that persuasion is contextual—motivation and ability determine the processing route, which in turn dictates whether the
particular characteristics of the message content, source, and recipient will render the
communication sufficiently influential to change the recipient’s attitude in the manner desired by the source. In the analysis that follows, I argue that legal training can
engage central-route processing; that messages conveyed through the curriculum can
be persuasive under conditions of high cognitive elaboration, given common features
of the university setting; and that the attitude changes that result from curricular persuasion can manifest in professional behavior. The takeaway is significant: while
contemporary theorists of international law are right to treat socialization as relevant,
they may be looking for it in the wrong place—the most promising venue is not an
elite international organization or foreign ministry, but instead the ubiquitous, even
mundane, classroom through which all lawyers must pass.
1. Central-Route Processing in International Legal Education
Experimental research suggests that the university setting is more than capable of
ensuring that students process curricular content primarily—even overwhelmingly
—along the ELM’s central route. This is true for several reasons.
First, an individual is more likely to carefully analyze a message that is clearly
linked to her values, accomplishment of personal objectives, or ability to justify a
position to others in a socially satisfactory manner.163 Social psychologists have re-

158. See RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION:
CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE 3 (1986).
159. Jennifer L. Aaker & Durairaj Maheswaran, The Effect of Cultural Orientation on Persuasion, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 315 (1997).
160. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 158, at 5–11.
161. Id. at 6–7.
162. Id. at 141–65.
163. See Blair T. Johnson & Alice H. Eagly, Effects of Involvement on Persuasion: A MetaAnalysis, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 290 (1989); Richard E. Petty, John T. Cacioppo & Rachel
Goldman, Personal Involvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J.
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ferred to these linkages as value, outcome, and impression involvement, respectively.164 As an example, one study found that the quality of the arguments made in
favor of a new university exam policy was a more important determinant of policy
acceptance among students who had reason to believe that the policy would affect
their ability to graduate, but that peripheral cues such as source expertise mattered
more among those who had been led to believe that the policy would take effect only
after they graduated.165 In essence, students had a stronger incentive to think hard
about the policy’s merits when they perceived its personal relevance.
Common features of university instruction suggest that similar dynamics can encourage central processing in the classroom. Value involvement may flow from normative messaging that encourages students to think about course content in terms of
personal values.166 Outcome involvement may result both from the perceived practical need to understand the material as a future professional, and from exams, which
can tether course content to academic and career goals by converting topical
knowledge into performance outcomes that affect graduation and employment prospects. Impression involvement can in turn result from class discussions and assignments, both of which incentivize students to learn the material to present themselves
in a favorable light to peers and faculty.
Second, individuals are more motivated to engage in central processing when they
have been primed to adopt an active self-concept that matches a message frame predetermined by the source of the communication.167 For instance, researchers in one
experiment primed participants to extraversion or introversion by exposing them to
words associated with one of those traits, and then had them read a product advertisement containing both arguments of high or low quality and language that matched
or mismatched the primed trait.168 The result was that, regardless of original personality, participants paid more attention to argument quality when the language in the
ad matched the prime.169 Priming thus molded active self-concepts so that recipients
would think more carefully about messages delivered in accordance with speakerselected frames.170 There is a sense in which this is also common in the university
setting, which can prime students to engage in central processing by repeatedly emphasizing the value of intellectual and professional ends that only careful thinking

PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847 (1981).
164. See Johnson & Eagly, supra note 163, at 290–93.
165. See Petty et al., supra note 163, at 852–54.
166. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 802–03 (1991).
167. S. Christian Wheeler, Kenneth G. DeMarree & Richard E. Petty, A Match Made in
the Laboratory: Persuasion and Matches to Primed Traits and Stereotypes, 44 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1035 (2008).
168. Id. at 1036
169. Id. at 1037–39; see also Steven J. Sherman, Diane M. Mackie & Denise M. Driscoll,
Priming and the Differential Use of Dimensions in Evaluation, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 405, 414–15 (1990) (reporting findings consistent with this conclusion).
170. In a sense, this is the opposite of the personal relevance concept discussed above,
which hinges on the idea that a speaker can generate central processing by matching a message
frame (i.e., that of self-relevance) to recipients’ predetermined self-concepts.
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can generate and then supplying a matching frame of sophistication in the classroom—the frame of the furrowed, professorial brow; chin-stroking pedanticism; rarefied nomenclatures; and the proud but arcane idiosyncrasies of the ivory tower.
A cluster of simpler dynamics can also encourage extensive cognitive elaboration
in the classroom. For instance, a moderate level of message repetition promotes central processing by creating more opportunities for recipients to scrutinize the message’s merits.171 Personal interaction between the message source and recipient,172
the use of multiple message sources,173 and the absence of distractions174 also enhance the motivation or ability to elaborate. Moreover, individuals who by disposition tend to engage in and enjoy effortful analytic activity are more likely to employ
central-route processing than those who do not.175 Universities can easily take advantage of these phenomena. Faculties can utilize relatively intimate classroom settings, with few external distractions, to expose students to course themes repeatedly
over time. And insofar as college and graduate students are more cognitively motivated than the general public, the message will have a receptive audience. In short,
the standard university classroom is an ideal venue for central processing.
This is a venue, moreover, in which the cognitive effort that occurs should tend
to be relatively bias free, for a couple of reasons. First, limited prior knowledge about
the subject of a communication facilitates unbiased information processing, while
extensive prior knowledge has the opposite effect.176 In essence, only people with
relevant knowledge are motivated to process new information in a way that protects
their preexisting views—their counterparts have nothing to protect. This is significant because, almost by definition, students tend to have limited knowledge on the
subject matter of a new course. Second, even with prior knowledge, message recipients tend to engage in unbiased processing when the subject of the communication
is of little emotional significance to them,177 when their knowledge is not easily retrievable from memory,178 or when they are led to believe that others will evaluate

171. John T. Cacioppo & Richard E. Petty, Effects of Message Repetition on Argument
Processing, Recall, and Persuasion, 10 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 9 (1989).
172. See Mark R. Young, The Motivational Effects of the Classroom Environment in Facilitating Self-Regulated Learning, 27 J. MARKETING EDUC. 25, 36 (2005).
173. See Stephen G. Harkins & Richard E. Petty, Information Utility and the Multiple
Source Effect, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 260 (1987).
174. See Richard E. Petty, Gary L. Wells & Timothy C. Brock, Distraction Can Enhance
or Reduce Yielding to Propaganda: Thought Disruption Versus Effort Justification, 34 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 874 (1976).
175. See John T. Cacioppo, Richard E. Petty & Katherine J. Morris, Effects of Need for
Cognition on Message Evaluation, Recall, and Persuasion, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 805, 814–15 (1983).
176. See Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 323, 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert,
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998).
177. See Wendy Wood, Nancy Rhodes & Michael Biek, Working Knowledge and Attitude
Strength: An Information-Processing Analysis, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 283, 290–93 (Richard E. Petty & Jon A. Krosnick eds., 1995).
178. See Wendy Wood, Retrieval of Attitude-Relevant Information from Memory: Effects
on Susceptibility to Persuasion and on Intrinsic Motivation, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 798 (1982).
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them on the validity of their conclusions.179 The emotional significance and mnemonic accessibility of attitudes will of course vary among students, but the accountability mechanisms of testing and class participation can provide a strong incentive
to process information anew, without simple reliance upon preexisting attitudes or
schema.
Here, too, the training thesis makes a modest claim: the social psychological evidence on the determinants of central versus peripheral routes, and biased versus unbiased processing, applies to the persuasive communications that occur in international legal education. As in other contexts, thoughtful pedagogy can create a robust
incentive for students to expend significant cognitive effort learning new material,
prime students to think like lawyers and then deliver a matching frame, enable personal interaction between professors and students, provide repetitious messaging,
utilize multiple message sources such as lectures and casebooks, and eliminate
distractions.
If anything, there is reason to believe that training on public international law can
yield even more robust and unbiased central processing than the courses that have
received primary attention in the political socialization literature. I would imagine,
for example, that international law students generally have less prior experience and
bias concerning the subject matter of their training than the students who completed
the courses on gender and racial diversity—two issues on which everyone has not
only some form of personal exposure, but also culturally ingrained viewpoints that
can be difficult to budge. Moreover, it is conceivable that law students, particularly
in countries where legal education happens at the graduate level, are on average
higher in dispositional need for cognition than undergraduates such as those studied
in the research on political socialization. And insofar as law students are more likely
to have identified their future vocation than many undergraduates, the knowledge
that their coursework carries at least some practical significance generates an even
greater incentive for careful thinking. For these students, law is not simply an elective
or a major, but an impending career.
The degree to which central and unbiased processing occurs will of course vary
among schools and courses. Where training in international law is not required, and
where professors do not skillfully employ techniques to encourage central processing, it is likely that few students will think hard about the subject.180 But the
mechanisms discussed above suggest that it is well within the power of legal educators to encourage students to think hard and objectively.181 This conclusion carries
two significant consequences. First, once central processing is engaged, there is a
distinct set of variables that will influence the degree to which the study of international law yields attitude change among students. And second, attitude change under
central processing can produce behavioral consequences. I take up these issues next.

179. See Robert A. Schuette & Russell H. Fazio, Attitude Accessibility and Motivation as
Determinants of Biased Processing: A Test of the MODE Model, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 704 (1995).
180. Cf. Barrett, supra note 39, at 854 (describing how enrollment rates in international
law courses in the United States have historically been low); Ku & Borgen, supra note 39, at
502–03 (same).
181. See supra Part II.B.1.
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2. Attitude Change Under Central-Route Processing
Where a professor of international law successfully engages unbiased centralroute processing among students, there are multiple reasons to think that formal instruction can yield attitude change. Some of the reasons are intuitive and concern
common attributes of the instructional message itself.182 For instance, messages are
more persuasive under central processing when they draw on evidentiary support,183
explicitly rebut counterarguments,184 and possess an open-ended quality that encourages recipients to draw their own conclusions.185 Persuasion in this context also depends in part on stylistic features. The inclusion of metaphors,186 for example, and
the use of language that projects social status and confidence187 both increase the
likelihood of attitude change under central processing. A couple of studies on evaluatively biased language—that is, language implying a particular normative orientation on the subject matter to which it relates—have also found that the words contained in the message can themselves produce attitude change.188 In one experiment,
university students formulated arguments about a proposed weekend driving ban for
adolescents after receiving a presentation containing either a set of pro-ban language,
such as “road safety,” “protective,” and “effective,” or anti-ban language, such as
“patronizing” and “scapegoat.”189 The researchers found not only that the biased language produced parallel shifts in attitudes, but also that the resulting attitudes persisted after the exposure.190 One way to understand these findings is to view the use
of evaluatively biased language as a form of issue framing, which media studies have
shown to affect attitudes among the public.191

182. For an overview, see generally Lijiang Shen & Elisabeth Bigsby, The Effects of Message
Features: Content, Structure, and Style, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF PERSUASION: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 20 (James Price Dillard & Lijiang Shen eds., 2d ed. 2013).
183. Rodney A. Reynolds & J. Lynn Reynolds, Evidence, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 427, 428 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002).
184. See Mike Allen, Meta-Analysis Comparing the Persuasiveness of One-Sided and
Two-Sided Messages, 55 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 390 (1991).
185. See Frank R. Kardes, Spontaneous Inference Processes in Advertising: The Effects of
Conclusion Omission and Involvement on Persuasion, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 225 (1988). But
see Daniel J. O’Keefe, Standpoint Explicitness and Persuasive Effect: A Meta-Analytic Review
of the Effects of Varying Conclusion Articulation in Persuasive Messages, 34
ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 1 (1997) (reviewing evidence that arguments are more persuasive
when explicit).
186. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO
POETIC METAPHOR 60–65 (1989).
187. See Nancy A. Burrell & Randal J. Koper, The Efficacy of Powerful/Powerless Language on Attitudes and Source Credibility, in PERSUASION: ADVANCES THROUGH METAANALYSIS 203 (Mike Allen & Raymond W. Preiss eds., 1998).
188. Els C. M. Van Schie, Carolien Martijn & Joop Van Der Pligt, Evaluative Language,
Cognitive Effort and Attitude Change, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 707, 708 (1994).
189. Id. at 708–10.
190. Id. at 711.
191. See, e.g., James N. Druckman, Cari Lynn Hennessy, Kristi St. Charles & Jonathan
Webber, Competing Rhetoric Over Time: Frames Versus Cues, 72 J. POL. 136 (2010); see also
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The source of an instructional message in the university setting also helps to explain how formal training can yield attitude change. Perhaps most importantly, professors as a group tend to enjoy substantial credibility in the sense that students generally perceive them as both knowing the “correct” views within their discipline, and
as motivated to communicate those views accurately and without expectation of personal gain. Such perceptions significantly enhance persuasion even under central
processing.192
Student attributes also play a role. Unsurprisingly, it is easier to persuade individuals who lack easy access to beliefs and memories of prior experiences regarding the
subject of a persuasive communication.193 One researcher has hypothesized that this
is true because individuals without such access have a harder time generating
counterarguments.194 Whatever the underlying cause, it goes without saying that this
phenomenon operates in the university setting, it being the case that most students
possess comparatively limited knowledge and experience regarding a new discipline.
In the aggregate, these phenomena indicate that the classroom is an ideal setting
in which to generate attitude change through significant cognitive elaboration. It is
ideal in part because so much is within the control of the professor—it is up to her
whether to marshal evidence in favor of any particular message, whether to address
counterarguments, whether to employ metaphor and empowered and evaluative language, and whether to frame issues in a way that shifts their salient features so as to
elicit audience agreement. It is an ideal setting, moreover, because it allows faculty
to employ tools of persuasion repeatedly over an extended period to a captive audience that is highly motivated to understand. And it is ideal due to the common perception of a substantial disparity between the knowledge and experience of the message source and of the recipients, the credibility that professors tend to enjoy, and the
fact that novices of any kind are usually more impressionable. Given the social psychological evidence, it is little wonder that courses on women’s studies, racial diversity, and the law of armed conflict have been able to generate attitude change among
students; it is hard to think of a better setting for persuasion through central-route
processing.
Once again, the claim of the training thesis is modest: the dynamics that social
psychologists have shown to contribute to attitude change under conditions of high
cognitive effort can also operate in the context of international legal training, includ-

Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611 (2010) (reviewing findings on framing effects).
192. See William J. McGuire, The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 3 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 136, 182–83 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 2d
ed. 1969); see also R. Glen Hass, Effects of Source Characteristics on Cognitive Responses
and Persuasion, in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN PERSUASION 141, 154 (Richard E. Petty, Thomas
M. Ostrom & Timothy C. Brock eds., 1981) (“Few areas of research in social psychology have
produced results as consistent as the findings that sources high in expertise and/or trustworthiness are more persuasive than those low in these qualities . . . .”).
193. Chenghuan Wu & David R. Shaffer, Susceptibility to Persuasive Appeals as a Function of Source Credibility and Prior Experience with the Attitude Object, 52 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 677 (1987).
194. See Wood, supra note 178, at 804.
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ing to promote or undermine student internalization of the idea that public international law is important and binding. The relevance of most of the tools discussed
above is obvious, but it is worth adding that the discipline of international law carries
with it a whole basket of evaluatively biased language. To say that a party “breaches”
a treaty, for example, is to evoke a comparison with contracts, which unquestionably
enjoy legal enforcement. To say that the permanent members of the UN Security
Council can “vote” on and “veto” proposed authorizations for the use of force is to
suggest that legal process governs Council operations. Even the term “public international law” overtly claims legal status for international norms. In these ways, the
lexicon of public international law is self-promoting to the point where even an otherwise neutral discussion of the discipline unavoidably uses a terminological frame
that encourages pro-compliance views.
I will take this a step further. Just as there is reason to think that more central
processing happens in the standard law school classroom than in the courses covered
by the political socialization literature, there is reason to think that messages about
international law in law school—whether pro or con—can be even more effective at
producing attitude change than those conveyed in the courses on women’s studies
and racial diversity.195 In part, this is due to a likely imbalance between the topicrelevant knowledge and experience of new students in these fields, with new
international law students seemingly having less of each and, as a result, being more
impressionable.196 It is also, in part, a product of the fact that many law professors
possess something that college professors in non-professional disciplines lack:
membership in a guild to which their students aspire to belong. The in-group status
of “lawyer” should intensify the persuasive influence of legal academics among prospective practitioners by adding a unique and potent form of additional credibility
and influence. And finally, legal education should be more effective at generating
attitude change than other types of formal training insofar as law schools tend to
inculcate within students a general sense of deference to hierarchy and authority,197
the result of which is to elevate the persuasive influence of those who deliver the
curriculum.

195. See supra notes 131–40 (collecting evidence regarding the persuasive effects of
courses on women’s studies and racial diversity).
196. I make this assumption for two reasons. First, matters of race and gender permeate
daily life in direct and ubiquitous ways that, for the most part, simply do not apply to international law. These permeations give rise to experiential knowledge that constitutes a robust,
non-university source of student attitudes on issues such as inequality and discrimination. Second, mass publics have not been particularly well informed on international affairs, particularly in the United States. See, e.g., Shanto Iyengar, Kyu S. Hahn, Heinz Bonfadelli & Mirko
Marr, “Dark Areas of Ignorance” Revisited: Comparing International Affairs Knowledge in
Switzerland and the United States, 36 COMM. RES. 341 (2009). While the public in a number
of European countries fared better in this research, knowledge is in all cases likely to be even
more limited on comparatively technical matters of international law. See, e.g., id. at 348 (reporting that, on international affairs, residents of Switzerland were generally much better informed than Americans).
197. See Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 54, 66–72 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
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3. The Behavioral Effects of Attitude Change
Of course, even if formal training persuades students to adopt new attitudes on
legal issues, it does not necessarily follow that those attitudes will matter. Separate
research shows that the certainty, extremity, emotional intensity, and subjective importance of an attitude affect its strength and resulting influence over cognition and—
most importantly—behavior.198 It is questionable whether these variables will operate robustly with respect to the study of international law. Students with academic
exposure to the discipline may remain uncertain about the status of global norms,
hold moderate and unemotional attitudes about compliance, and perceive the discipline as tangential to their professional goals. Moreover, upon becoming practitioners, they might forget what they learned, change their mind in light of other messages,
or simply choose not to act in accordance with views they internalized during law
school. If the attitudes generated by curricular messages about international law are
weak, then there is little reason to think they will affect how graduates behave, and
the training thesis cannot explain state action.
But this line of reasoning seems overly pessimistic. In fact, a number of considerations support the view that attitudes acquired through training can influence the
behavior of practitioners even over the long term. First, there is a great deal of evidence that attitudes can affect cognitions and behavior,199 and that attitudes developed through significant cognitive effort are substantially more influential than those
acquired via the peripheral route.200 For instance, many of the same variables that
shape an individual’s motivation and ability to think carefully about a message also
affect the persistence of the attitude changes that result.201 Just as message repetition,
dispositional need for cognition, and personal relevance intensify a recipient’s ability
and motivation to engage in central processing, they also lead the recipient to
maintain a newly acquired attitude for a longer period of time.202 Researchers have
interpreted this parallel to mean that central-route attitudes are more likely to
endure.203 Additionally, experiments have shown that attitudes resulting from
extensive elaboration on a message are more resistant to subsequent,

198. See generally Penny S. Visser, George Y. Bizer & Jon A. Krosnick, Exploring the
Latent Structure of Strength-Related Attitude Attributes, 38 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1 (2006) (discussing the effects of these variables and the relationships between them).
199. John T. Cacioppo, Stephen G. Harkins & Richard E. Petty, The Nature of Attitudes
and Cognitive Responses and Their Relationships to Behavior, in COGNITIVE RESPONSES IN
PERSUASION 31, 51−53 (Richard E. Petty, Thomas M. Ostrom & Timothy C. Brock eds., 1981).
200. See PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 158, at 173–95.
201. Richard E. Petty, Curtis P. Haugtvedt & Stephen M. Smith, Elaboration as a Determinant of Attitude Strength: Creating Attitudes That Are Persistent, Resistant, and Predictive
of Behavior, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 177, at
93, 100–08.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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counterattitudinal argumentation204 and are more likely to guide behavior.205
Particularly noteworthy is that the duration and amount of careful thinking that
occurred in these experiments is far less than that which occurs during even a single
course on international law. One of the studies, for instance, found evidence that a
single, momentary exposure to an advertisement can generate behavioral effects
when consumers think carefully about the message.206 A fortiori, extensive and
elaborate cognitions about international law based on repeated message exposure
over the course of many weeks can also influence behavior. One explanation for this
effect is that, having thought carefully about the merits and implications of a
message, a recipient who has undertaken substantial elaboration will tend to hold
greater confidence in the correctness of the resulting attitude, which will in turn
embolden him to maintain it, resist counterattitudinal appeals, and enact it
behaviorally.207 Another explanation is that the cognitive effort that central
processing entails makes the resultant attitude more accessible in memory and thus
available to facilitate counterargumentation and guide behavior.208
Second, the prediction of behavioral consequences makes sense in light of priming theory, which posits that individuals ordinarily do not exhaustively analyze the
merits and implications of the various judgments and choices that they make, but
instead rely on the knowledge that is the most accessible in memory at the time of
decision.209 In ELM terms, accessible knowledge operates as a heuristic influence on
behavior when individuals lack the motivation or ability to engage in more substantial elaboration. This theory enjoys substantial empirical support210 and helps to explain, for example, how media emphases on selected political issues can shape public
perceptions of the President and voting behavior.211 Another way to think about the

204. Id. at 108–14; see also Curtis P. Haugtvedt & Richard E. Petty, Personality and Persuasion: Need for Cognition Moderates the Persistence and Resistance of Attitude Changes,
63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 308, 317–18 (1992) (finding that, among individuals who
possess a high subjective need for cognition, the ability to recall a larger number of attitudecompatible arguments correlates with a greater tendency to reject counterattitudinal
messages).
205. Petty et al., supra note 201, at 114–19.
206. See Richard E. Petty, John T. Cacioppo & David Schumann, Central and Peripheral
Routes to Advertising Effectiveness: The Moderating Role of Involvement, 10 J. CONSUMER
RES. 135 (1983).
207. PETTY & CACIOPPO, supra note 158, at 22.
208. Russell H. Fazio, Attitudes as Object-Evaluation Associations: Determinants, Consequences, and Correlates of Attitude Accessibility, in ATTITUDE STRENGTH: ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 177, at 247, 250–51.
209. Jon A. Krosnick & Donald R. Kinder, Altering the Foundations of Support for the
President Through Priming, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 497, 499 (1990).
210. See, e.g., Gerald M. Kosicki, The Media Priming Effect: News Media and Considerations Affecting Political Judgments, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 183, at 63.
211. See Joanne M. Miller & Jon A. Krosnick, News Media Impact on the Ingredients of
Presidential Evaluations: A Program of Research on the Priming Hypothesis, in POLITICAL
PERSUASION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE 79, 86–92 (Diana C. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman & Richard
A. Brody eds., 1996) (using case studies on the Persian Gulf War and the Iran-Contra scandal
to test hypotheses regarding the effects of priming on public perceptions of presidential
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training thesis is to view international legal training as a prime that supplies topical
knowledge and attitudes that are accessible later to guide action when the practitioner’s motivation or ability to rethink fundamental issues such as the legitimacy of
international law is more limited. The prime is powerful insofar as the central-route
processing that happens in law school produces accessible attitudes,212 and because
individuals who are less knowledgeable about a subject are more susceptible to
primes.213
Finally, even assuming that the attitudes resulting from training on international
law at times lack sufficient strength to influence behavior, they are not unavoidably
weak. Thoughtful pedagogy can magnify attitude strength by enhancing the certainty, extremity, emotional intensity, and subjective importance of the compliance
question among students. One study has found, for example, that the repeated articulation of an attitude has the effect of elevating its personal importance to the
speaker.214 Courses and other forms of training, such as clinics, that encourage student participation might capture this effect. Likewise, the evidence on the persuasive
influence of credible sources suggests that the certainty and extremity of student attitudes will depend at least in part on the clarity and intensity with which faculty
members convey a particular compliance message.215
In summary, substantial evidence supports the first premise of the training thesis.
There is an abundance of empirical support for the idea that education in a university
setting can affect student attitudes and behavior. Thus, regardless of whether faculties choose to persuade future practitioners with a message that favors or disfavors
public international law, it is plausible and even likely that the chosen message will
—when skillfully delivered—yield lasting effects on the individual and collective
behavior of law graduates. In a sense, lawyers are what law schools make of them.
III. THE INFLUENCE OF LAWYERS ON THE STATE
For the training thesis to shed light on the efficacy of international law, it must
next be true that law graduates who have been persuaded to support or disregard
international law exert meaningful influence over the compliance decisions of the
states in which they reside. In this Part, I discuss studies supporting this idea, illuminate the processes by which professional influence can occur, and then suggest that
cross-national variations in the formal structure of national governments will mediate
the availability and significance of these processes. The analysis completes the process of tracing the independent variable of training to the dependent variable of official policy by connecting the effects of training to state action.

performance).
212. See Kardes, supra note 185, at 231.
213. Miller & Krosnick, supra note 211, at 94–95.
214. See Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Attitude Importance as a Function of Repeated
Attitude Expression, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 39 (1994).
215. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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A. The Conversion of Professional Ideology into State Policy
Individuals whose legal training has led them to support, disregard, or oppose
public international law can shape state compliance in any of four basic professional
roles: (1) as government elites with direct influence over compliance decisions and
public opinion; (2) as activists who pressure the state to adopt or reject policies of
obedience; (3) as private practitioners who may either utilize or ignore international
law in the course of representing clients; and (4) as experts who shape popular perceptions of international law through discourse. These roles are all independent, but
the training thesis anticipates that they will operate in the same direction and in a
manner congruent to the persuasive messages that legal professionals internalized as
law students. I discuss each in turn.
1. Lawyers as Government Officials
The most obvious form of influence occurs when individuals with legal training
occupy positions of power within the government, including positions such as
judges, prosecutors, legislators, and foreign policy elites. Such influence has been
common in much of the world for quite some time.216 Without even counting national
judiciaries, Robert Putnam once observed that lawyers are politically prominent
“[a]lmost everywhere” in that they “comprise roughly 15 to 25 percent of most national legislatures” and “have also traditionally supplied the lion’s share of the bureaucratic elite in many countries.”217 The pattern is no accident. Government is a
natural destination for lawyers insofar as their profession enjoys social status,218 the

216. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE
SHADOW OF EMPIRE 76–80 (2010) (discussing the prominence of lawyers in Philippine politics); AKIRA KUBOTA, HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN POSTWAR JAPAN: THEIR SOCIAL ORIGINS,
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS, AND CAREER PATTERNS 81 (1969) (reporting that nearly seventy percent of Japanese bureaucrats at the time had a law degree); MICHAEL L. MEZEY,
COMPARATIVE LEGISLATURES 239 (1979) (“Lawyers and other professionals tend to dominate
the membership of most parliaments.”); Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo, Rule of Law and Lawyers in
Latin America, 603 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 179, 183 (2006) (discussing a tradition of lawyers filling high government positions in Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); Robert D. Putnam, The Political Attitudes of Senior Civil Servants in Western
Europe: A Preliminary Report, 3 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 257, 266–67 (1973) (reporting data on the
educational backgrounds of senior civil servants in Europe and the United States). There is, of
course, variation among states on this front. For instance, Putnam observed that lawyers were
less common in elite government positions in communist and Scandinavian countries in the
1970s, and were of declining importance in the parliaments of France and Italy. ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES 59 n.40 (1976).
217. PUTNAM, supra note 216, at 59; see also DONALD R. MATTHEWS, THE SOCIAL
BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS 30 (1954) (“One small occupational group, the
legal profession, has supplied a large majority of America’s top-level public officials throughout our entire history.”).
218. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 503–18 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Floating Press 2009) (1840) (ebook).
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ability to practice law intermittently facilitates forays into politics,219 lawyers’ monopoly of many law enforcement and judicial offices places them in a favorable position to occupy other official roles,220 and states’ utilization of law to impose order
and inform policy making creates a pressing internal demand for legal expertise.221
Scholars have found anecdotal evidence that the lawyers who hold public office
tend to exert a unique and non-trivial influence over the state.222 For example, based
on a series of interviews and other research, Laura Dickinson found that American
Judge Advocate Generals have generated demonstrable improvements in the U.S.
military’s compliance with international law by training, advising, and investigating
troops.223 Michael Scharf reported several instances in which the United States chose
to comply with international obligations specifically because of advice from the
Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department.224 In part, this influence flows
from the formal prerogatives that accompany public office: Some officials with legal
backgrounds possess authority to make national policy. Others are institutionally positioned to inject legal considerations into a policy calculus. Still others wield power
to exercise enforcement discretion on a retail basis. In part, influence also results
from the persuasive force of legal expertise,225 which receives considerable deference
in many societies around the world.226 The training thesis thus anticipates that law
graduates oriented to promote or disregard international law as government officials
will, in aggregate, be able to exert meaningful influence over state action.
This line of thinking draws support from research on the causative power of ideas
in policy making, including anecdotal evidence that the topical and ideological orientations of university training shape state behavior by molding future elites.227 For

219. See FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 85, 93–95 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills trans. & eds., 1946).
220. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View, 1 MIDWEST
J. POL. SCI. 26, 31–32 (1957).
221. For an assessment of these arguments, see HEINZ EULAU & JOHN D. SPRAGUE,
LAWYERS IN POLITICS: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL CONVERGENCE 31–53 (1964).
222. For an example of scholarship suggesting that government lawyers influence federal
policy making, see generally PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982). For a critique
of this view, see, e.g., Robert L. Nelson, John P. Heinz, Edward O. Laumann & Robert H.
Salisbury, Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237
(1988).
223. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of
International Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–27 (2010).
224. Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution
to the Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45, 68–73 (2009).
225. Laurin A. Wollan, Jr., Lawyers in Government—“The Most Serviceable Instruments
of Authority,” 38 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 105, 106–07 (1978).
226. See, e.g., George Y. M. Won & In-Hwan Oh, The Korean Lawyer: A Study of Career
Development, 4 KOREAN STUDIES 51, 101 (1980) (“The law profession in Korea enjoys high
prestige at present, and access to the profession remains somewhat restricted.”).
227. See, e.g., EMANUEL ADLER, THE POWER OF IDEOLOGY: THE QUEST FOR
TECHNOLOGICAL AUTONOMY IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL 5 (1987) (explaining that in
Argentina and Brazil, the choice between policies favoring the acquisition of foreign technology or national technological autonomy depended on domestic ideological factors); William
Ascher, New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies: The
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instance, David Law and Wen-Chen Chang have found that justices on the
Taiwanese Constitutional Court routinely consult foreign law in deciding cases, and
that there is a “strong correlation” between the patterns of this practice and the justices’ educational backgrounds228—justices who obtained a master’s or doctoral degree in Germany were responsible for a clear majority of the Court’s citations to
German law, while those with American legal training were responsible for a majority of the citations to U.S. law.229
Similarly, in an historical account of U.S. trade policy, Judith Goldstein has found
that national interest is incapable of explaining why the United States retained protectionist policies well into the twentieth century, given that the nation would have
benefited from low tariffs much earlier.230 Instead, U.S. policies at the time were a
product of the domestic hegemony of protectionist economic ideas, which conditioned the way in which political elites interpreted events and crowded out alternative
paradigms.231 Most intriguingly, Goldstein notes that free-trade ideas began to predominate in university classrooms much earlier, but nevertheless failed initially to
influence government elites due to a lack of political interest and the inability of
academic economists to communicate effectively with policymakers.232 It was not
until the diffusion of these ideas in the 1930s, after “a generation of students [had
been] trained in classical economics,” that the United States undertook a major shift
toward lower tariffs.233 Academic economists, it appears, had not become any more
effective at communicating with government elites, but their old students, some of
whom were now policy makers, had themselves become influential vectors of the
ideas that began to dominate in the classroom years before.234 The result was an ample supply of liberal solutions to the crisis of the Great Depression and, ultimately, a
fundamental shift away from protectionism.235 These findings suggest that formal
training remains influential even decades after it occurs.236 Scholars have argued that

Case of the World Bank, 37 INT’L ORG. 415 (1983) (arguing that World Bank staff are resistant
to new programs due to ethical and professional standards that accompany their self-concepts
as technical experts); Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The
Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, 25 COMP. POL. 275 (1993) (discussing how the
flow of ideas about economics has been an important influence on the process of economic
policy making in Britain).
228. David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dialogue, 86 WASH.
L. REV. 523, 571 (2011).
229. Id. at 558. Law and Chang depict this behavior primarily as a reflection of competency
by suggesting that judges are more likely to use and cite foreign law when they understand it,
see id. at 571–72, but the training thesis suggests socialization as an additional mechanism—
that is, some justices utilize German or American law more frequently not simply because they
are familiar with it, but because the universities at which they studied persuaded them, intentionally or not, to view those authorities as worthy of consideration.
230. JUDITH GOLDSTEIN, IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 81–136 (1993).
231. Id. at 127–36.
232. See id. at 88–90.
233. Id. at 249.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 248–50.
236. See David S. Law, Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 927, 1015–20 (2015) (discussing the influence of legal education on the use of foreign
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ideas affect policy in these types of cases by supplying vocabularies that define and
limit the range of possible actions,237 serving as lenses that color the processing of
new information238 and perceptions of self-interest,239 and providing conceptual organization in a world of incomplete information and uncertainty.240
Research on public opinion suggests an additional but less direct form of influence. In a twist on the traditional model of democratic governance, which posits that
government officials act to effectuate public preferences, social scientists have found
that mass publics often form their opinions about political and social issues by taking
cues from government elites.241 Officials’ rhetorical support for or disagreement with
even expert opinions on salient social issues tends to yield matching effects among
the general public.242 This can happen when an issue is of direct and immediate personal relevance to a population, such as whether to raise local taxes, but it is more
common and robust on issues of greater abstraction.243 Theorists have proffered a
couple of explanations. One is that members of the public tend to lack sufficient
knowledge and motivation to rigorously evaluate complex policy issues, so they rely
on the positions of trusted officials as decisional shortcuts.244 A more Machiavellian
take is that elites are able to manipulate public opinion by deploying issue frames to
encourage the public to think about policy along strategically selected dimensions.245
There is reason to anticipate that elite cues and frames will be influential, specifically on matters of international law compliance. First, historically, most of the
American public has not devoted significant effort to independent thinking on

law in judicial opinions); Law & Chang, supra note 228, at 571–72 (same).
237. Albert S. Yee, The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies, 50 INT’L ORG. 69, 94–101 (1996).
238. Alexander L. George, The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and DecisionMaking Behavior: The “Operational Code” Belief System, in PSYCHOLOGICAL MODELS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 95, 101–04 (Lawrence S. Falkowski ed., 1979).
239. See KATHRYN SIKKINK, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS: DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BRAZIL AND
ARGENTINA 243 (1991).
240. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 230, at 254. For an analysis on the role of individual beliefs
in foreign policymaking, see generally YAACOV Y. I. VERTZBERGER, THE WORLD IN THEIR
MINDS: INFORMATION PROCESSING, COGNITION, AND PERCEPTION IN FOREIGN POLICY
DECISIONMAKING (1990).
241. See, e.g., Adam J. Berinsky, Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American
Public Support for Military Conflict, 69 J. POL. 975 (2007); Matthew Gabel & Kenneth
Scheve, Estimating the Effect of Elite Communications on Public Opinion Using Instrumental
Variables, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1013 (2007).
242. David Darmofal, Elite Cues and Citizen Disagreement with Expert Opinion, 58 POL.
RES. Q. 381 (2005).
243. See David M. Paul & Clyde Brown, Testing the Limits of Elite Influence on Public
Opinion: An Examination of Sports Facility Referendums, 54 POL. RES. Q. 871, 871 (2001)
(discussing scholarly research that shows elite influence with respect to abstract issues that
citizens have difficulty connecting to their lives).
244. See Darmofal, supra note 242, at 382; James H. Kuklinski & Norman L. Hurley, On
Hearing and Interpreting Political Messages: A Cautionary Tale of Citizen Cue-Taking, 56 J.
POL. 729 (1994); see also ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 2 (1998).
245. See, e.g., W. Lance Bennett, The Paradox of Public Discourse: A Framework for the
Analysis of Political Accounts, 42 J. POL. 792 (1980).
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international affairs, due to a perception that the subject carries only limited and
indirect personal relevance.246 Insofar as this is also true of the public in other states,
the result may be a general willingness to rely on elite cues. Second, an uninformed
public is more vulnerable to framing effects.247 Given evidence that national publics
often lack even basic knowledge about international affairs,248 much less arguments
about the status and contours of international law, it seems to follow that elite frames
on compliance issues can shape public opinion. In fact, a series of recent experiments
suggests as much. One found that between two groups of subjects exposed to a
message about U.S. interrogation methods in the war on terrorism, those who read
an additional message that the methods violate international treaties were more likely
to disapprove of the U.S. practice than those who received no international law
message.249 Other work has shown similar effects in different areas of international
law and policy.250 Legally trained elites may be able to capture these dynamics by
strategically deploying or omitting arguments about the international legal
implications of contested policies.
Inevitably, within any given state, there will be groups of political elites who favor
or oppose compliance with international law for ideological or other reasons, regardless of legal training. The training thesis contends simply that the size and influence
of those groups will vary depending on the attitudes with which generations of lawyers enter government service. Where law schools influence future government elites
to discount international law, government institutions oriented toward the discipline
will have a harder time generating interdepartmental and interbranch support for
compliance, which will in turn complicate efforts to generate pro-compliance policies and concordant cues and frames for the public. Where law schools influence
future elites to view international law as real law, the opposite is more likely to occur.
2. Lawyers as Activists
A second form of influence occurs when individuals with legal training operate
as activists within civil society to pressure the state to adopt a particular course of
action on an issue that implicates international norms. Legally trained activists can
influence state policy through both institutional and other means; some might engage
in litigation, lobbying, or voter drives, while others might organize boycotts or

246. See, e.g., MARTIN E. GOLDSTEIN, AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY: DRIFT OR DECISION 148
(1984) (discussing evidence of longstanding apathy and ignorance toward foreign affairs
among the American public).
247. See, e.g., Darmofal, supra note 242, at 390–91.
248. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 246 (discussing evidence pertaining to the United
States).
249. Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An
Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105, 119–21 (2013).
250. See, e.g., Stephen Chaudoin, Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions, 68 INT’L ORG. 235 (2014); Adam S. Chilton,
The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental
Study, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 110 (2014); Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International
Law on Preferences and Beliefs (Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.stanford
.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-IntlLaw-2008-02-11a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZJD-LH53].
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demonstrations to mobilize public opinion. That these types of individuals have at
times exerted substantial influence over state policy hardly requires extensive elaboration here. Even just a few names make the point: Thurgood Marshall,251 Raphael
Lemkin,252 Peter Benenson,253 and influential members of the founders of the United
States.254
International relations theorists have elaborated on the various means by which
civil society actors shape compliance decisions. Some of this work focuses on how
transnational networks comprising NGOs and individual activists contribute to the
development of international norms. Richard Price, for example, found that a collection of transnational groups was primarily responsible for the emergence of a global
norm against the use of antipersonnel land mines.255 These actors generated and disseminated information to teach states that land mines were a problem, networked
with governments and international organizations to access and influence the policymaking process, ensured that their campaign resonated with national publics by grafting it onto a preexisting and widely accepted ban on weapons of mass destruction,
and shifted the burden of proof against land mines by demanding that states publicly
justify any use.256 Other scholarship focuses on how transnational activists contribute
to state compliance with extant norms. For instance, Amy Gurowitz has shown that
human rights advocates in Japan wielded international human rights covenants to
argue more forcefully against national policies that discriminated against Koreans
and migrant workers.257 Audie Klotz found that, notwithstanding countervailing national interests, transnational anti-apartheid activists successfully mobilized U.S.
support for sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s by framing apartheid in terms
of a prevailing civil rights discourse of racial equality and obtaining access to those
with decision-making power in government.258 And in a noteworthy book, Thomas
Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink collected case studies suggesting that
transnational networks effectively diffuse international human rights norms and generate compliance even among recalcitrant states by raising moral consciousness, mobilizing domestic opposition, and persuading international actors to apply pressure
in favor of new policies.259 On this particular account, the networks are effective

251. See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
(1998) (discussing Marshall’s work and legacy).
252. See generally Sergey Sayapin, Raphael Lemkin: A Tribute, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1157
(2009) (discussing Lemkin’s career and work in promoting an international prohibition on
genocide).
253. See generally SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010)
(discussing Benenson’s work as the founder of Amnesty International).
254. See generally Erwin C. Surrency, The Lawyer and the Revolution, 8 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 125 (1964).
255. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land
Mines, 52 INT’L ORG. 613 (1998).
256. Id. at 619–37.
257. Gurowitz, supra note 26.
258. Audie Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa, 49 INT’L ORG. 451 (1995).
259. Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights
Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp &
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because of their ability to generate both pressure and dialogue—a target state initially
responds to accusations of unlawful behavior by denying the validity of an applicable
international norm, but then offers tactical concessions to dampen mounting criticism
and, eventually, in the course of arguing with network agents, internalizes the norm’s
validity and starts to comply.260
The training thesis connects with this literature by suggesting that national legal
communities are important nodes in the transnational networks that researchers have
found capable of generating norm internalization and obedience. Not only can lawyers provide resources to full-time activists, such as financial support or expert counsel; they can also operate as norm entrepreneurs through creative litigation;261 form
or contribute to organizations that lobby for policies of compliance or disregard;262
serve as sources of expertise for government elites grappling with international problems;263 and exert influence through non-institutional means such as rallies, strikes,
and demonstrations.264 The training thesis contends that the number of individuals
able and motivated to engage in these behaviors will vary with the nature of the international legal training that occurs in the domestic setting.
What is particularly intriguing here is that, if they so choose, members of national
legal communities are well positioned to be at least as influential as many of the
activists covered in the literature on transnational networks. This is in part because
lawyers often go into government service, as discussed above.265 But it is also true
because they know the “rules of the game,” often possess substantial financial means,
interact with each other and political and economic elites, and tend to enjoy professional esteem. These forms of power suggest that, in the terminology of neoliberal
international relations theory, communities of lawyers with specific and educationally derived orientations on international law might constitute one of the interest

Kathryn Sikkink eds., 1999).
260. Id. at 11–17; see also Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks,
and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT’L ORG. 411 (1993) (discussing the influence of
transnational human rights networks on state policy).
261. One example is the lawyers at the Center for Constitutional Rights, who broke new
ground in the early eighties by successfully asserting federal jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute for the adjudication of alleged violations of international human rights law. See
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
262. See Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism, 59 INT’L
ORG. 363 (2005) (arguing that compliance decisions reflect the relative power of competing
domestic constituencies); Joel P. Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political
Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 127,
144–45 (2010) (discussing the effect of pro- and anti-international law lobbies on compliance).
263. See, e.g., Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Negotiating Globalization:
Global Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes, 31 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 521, 529–32 (2006) (discussing how legal experts mediate the translation,
enactment, and implementation of international norms at the national level).
264. See, e.g., Eric Cheung & Tom Phillips, Hong Kong: Lawyers and Activists March
Against Beijing ‘Meddling,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2016/nov/08/hundreds-silently-march-in-hong-kong-in-protest-at-beijing-meddling [https://
perma.cc/6RNU-DQCP] (discussing the role of lawyers in public protests against Beijing’s
intervention in Hong Kong’s elections).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 216–21.
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groups that scholars have found to exert influence over foreign policy.266 In the different terminology of social movements theory, legal professionals might matter because their expertise, status, and social connections amount to important intellectual,
cultural, and organizational resources that a transnational network can marshal in
favor of or against state action with international legal implications.267 These professionals are established polity members who collectively wield sufficient influence to
see that the decision-making process accounts for their interests,268 and are influential
allies who can create or foreclose political opportunities for norm internalization.269
Thinking about legal professionals in these ways transforms the case studies on transnational networks into indirect but additional empirical support for the training thesis—if civil society influences compliance and lawyers are influential members of
civil society, then lawyer activists matter to compliance. And if these lawyers matter,
then we should be concerned with the sources of their ideas about international
norms.
3. Lawyers as Practitioners
A third form of influence occurs when lawyers enact in private law practice the
orientations that they obtained from their training. Among those who studied international law and internalized the view that it counts as “real law,” the enactment
manifests as the inclusion of international legal principles and insights in advice to
clients; in claims, defenses, and arguments before courts; and in communications
with opposing parties. Among those who received no education on international law,
or who received an education that downplays the status of the discipline, the enactment tends to be one of silence—the omission of international rules from practice,
even when relevant. The difference reflects the reality that circumstance never completely dictates the laws and arguments that one employs in the course of client representation; there is always room for creativity and discretion. It also reflects the fact
that lawyers can deploy rules of law to serve client interests only when they know
and understand them. And it reflects the condition that a lawyer’s choice of argumentation inevitably reflects his or her subjective perception of persuasive merits.
Even where domestic rules of legal ethics encourage creativity and analytical rigor
by demanding vigorous representation, those rules do little to promote the utilization
of international norms when lawyers and the broader profession hold preexisting perceptions of the norms as sublegal, ineffective, and irrelevant.

266. See generally PETER GOUREVITCH, POLITICS IN HARD TIMES: COMPARATIVE
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISES (1986) (arguing that realignments of domestic political coalitions explain national responses to economic crises); JACK SNYDER, MYTHS
OF EMPIRE: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AMBITION (1991) (arguing that expansionist foreign policies are attributable to domestic political groups with imperialist interests).
267. See generally JOHN D. MCCARTHY & MAYER N. ZALD, THE TREND OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION (1973) (developing the resource mobilization theory of social movements).
268. See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK
INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 20–24 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing research on this issue).
269. See SIDNEY G. TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 166–67 (3d ed. 2011).
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There is anecdotal evidence that these differences manifest regularly in courts and
law offices around the world. In the United States, where historically only a small
minority of practitioners has taken even one course on international law,270 lawyers
often overlook relevant doctrines and rules. For example, Sandra Babcock notes that
in the first two decades immediately following U.S. ratification of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, criminal defense lawyers hardly ever raised arguments based on the treaty because “few law school graduates understand the relevance of international law in domestic legal proceedings.”271 She attributes this tendency to the fact that “[i]nternational law is not a required subject in the vast majority
of law schools in the United States.”272 Similarly, with respect to Japan, another
country that does not require training in international law, Amy Gurowitz observed
that “Japanese courts . . . are reluctant to deal with arguments based on international
law, in part because they tend to be relatively unfamiliar with it.”273 Under the training thesis, none of this is accidental or even surprising; national fluency in international law corresponds closely with whether and to what extent prospective practitioners acquire training in the discipline.
It is probably true that lawyers in some countries avoid arguments based on international law not because of limited personal knowledge or hostility, but simply because they anticipate that the arguments will be unpersuasive to others. For instance,
Philip Trimble has suggested that lawyers prefer to use constitutional rather than international law in criminal trials in U.S. courts because constitutional law is more
familiar and persuasive to American judges.274 But this observation calls for further
inquiry on why international law is less persuasive in the first place. Judges must
acquire their views about international law from somewhere. Would they find international authority to be more persuasive if they had studied the discipline and internalized pro-compliance attitudes during law school? And would they find international law more compelling if American lawyers did? Would a steady stream of
international claims and arguments elevate the status of this body of law in the eyes
of the judiciary? The training thesis says yes, yes, and yes.275 There is nothing inherently unpersuasive about international authority.

270. Barrett, supra note 39, at 854; Ku & Borgen, supra note 39, at 502–03.
271. Sandra Babcock, The Role of International Law in United States Death Penalty Cases,
15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 367, 374 n.31 (2002).
272. Id.
273. Gurowitz, supra note 26, at 437.
274. Philip R. Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42
STAN. L. REV. 811, 839 (1990) (discussing evidence that lawyers prefer to use constitutional
rather than international law in criminal trials in U.S. courts because constitutional law is more
familiar to American judges).
275. Cf. Aharon Barak, Response to The Judge as Comparatist: Comparison in Public Law,
80 TULANE L. REV. 195, 195 (2005) (describing a cycle whereby “[j]udges [do] not tend to
rely on comparative law; lawyers d[o] not cite comparative law to judges; law schools d[o]
not stress comparative law; scholars d[o] not emphasize comparative law; judges d[o] not tend
to rely on comparative law; and so on”).
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4. Lawyers as Experts
The fourth and final form of influence occurs when individuals with legal training
act as experts to provide counsel and opinion on matters of international law. There
is a sense in which the other roles each encompass this one, given that they envision
influence derived in part from authoritative claims to special forms of knowledge.
But the role of a legal expert differs from the others in that it is, by appearances at
least, less partisan and more committed to objectivity. Unlike the lawyer as
government elite, the legal expert is not constrained by bureaucracy or political
expediency. Unlike the lawyer as activist, she intentionally avoids partisan advocacy
and commits to no cause other than an unbiased explication of legal principles. And
unlike the practitioner, she is not a mercenary. Graduates might acquire this role by
becoming legal academics, public intellectuals, certain types of media commentators,
and the like.
The legal expert’s influence derives both from what she says and who she is. By
writing in academic journals and providing public commentary to news media, she
identifies previously unrecognized problems, proposes solutions, resolves uncertainties, and supplies interpretations. Because of her qualifications, nonpartisan
status, and the complex or technical nature of the problem at hand, she attracts an
audience. Her opinions are capable of generating sizable shifts in public opinion276
and can exert substantial influence over policy makers, including those involved in
foreign policy.277 This influence appears to derive in part from an ability to frame the
way in which others understand issues,278 in part from third-party reliance on expertise as a low-effort heuristic that suggests credibility and encourages deference,279
and in part from the way in which a comparative lack of personal experience and
knowledge limits the audience’s capacity to counterargue.
The claim of the training thesis is that the persuasive messaging that occurs in the
classroom will also affect the tenor of expert opinion on matters of international law.
Where the socialization process is effective, the long-term result will be a “body of
conventional knowledge strong enough to compel agreement among differently predisposed users.”280 Generations of legal experts will arrive at an orthodoxy on the

276. See, e.g., KAREN S. JOHNSON-CARTEE, NEWS NARRATIVES AND NEWS FRAMING:
CONSTRUCTING POLITICAL REALITY 220–25 (2005) (discussing evidence of expert influence
on public opinion); JOHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION 319–28
(1992) (same); Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro & Glenn R. Dempsey, What Moves Public
Opinion?, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23, 35–36, 39 (1987) (same).
277. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?,
99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 117, 120–21 (2005).
278. Cf. Adam J. Berinsky & Donald R. Kinder, Making Sense of Issues Through Media
Frames: Understanding the Kosovo Crisis, 68 J. POL. 640 (2006) (finding that media frames
affect citizen understanding and opinions on matters of foreign policy).
279. See generally Richard E. Petty, Pablo Briñol & Joseph R. Priester, Mass Media Attitude Change: Implications of the Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in MEDIA
EFFECTS: ADVANCES IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 125 (Jennings Bryant & Mary Beth Oliver
eds., 3d ed. 2009) (supplying a social psychological framework for evaluating the influence of
mass media).
280. ZALLER, supra note 276, at 325.
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status and value of international law writ large, even if they disagree about the content or application of particular norms. This orthodoxy will not only color the conclusions that the experts provide to others, but serve as a force multiplier in the persuasion process as third parties realize that even otherwise diverse commentators
agree on fundamental principles. Put differently, the creation of expert orthodoxy on
matters of international law is an intergenerational process, and law schools are at
the center of it. Whether future experts promote or undermine international law is
partially up to the current experts who shape tomorrow’s consensus. That consensus
will in turn shape the conclusions of both government elites and the nature and tenor
of national discourse on compliance questions as experts communicate their informed views to a receptive public.281
This conclusion finds support in research on epistemic communities.282 International relations scholars have developed an impressive array of case studies showing
that these groups are able to empower or limit the influence of ideas by wielding their
expertise to provide the public and government decision makers with advice about
the likely consequences of policy options, frame issues for discussion, develop fixes,
and identify state interests.283 As an example, Emanuel Adler has shown that an epistemic community of American scientists and civilian strategists was instrumental
in generating a shift in U.S. nuclear policy toward bilateral arms control from the
1950s to the early 1970s.284 Members of think tanks and university faculties began
by cultivating and packaging a set of new ideas involving the utility of technical
verification measures, insights from game theory, and the limitations of deterrence
at conferences and in academic publications.285 These experts then worked to convert
their theories into national policy by acquiring influence within the government.286
Community members had the ear of President Eisenhower, their ideas acquired bureaucratic support with the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
they won congressional allies who disseminated pro-arms control views to the public, and many of them obtained important positions within the executive branch.287
Moreover, these same individuals played a critical role in persuading an initially
skeptical group of elites from the Soviet Union to also pursue arms control.288 One
important product was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the United States and

281. See generally MARC LYNCH, STATE INTERESTS AND PUBLIC SPHERES: THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF JORDAN’S IDENTITY (1999) (arguing that the process of formulating arguments in the public sphere influences state policy by constituting the meaning and
range of legitimate state action and interests).
282. Cf. Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining epistemic communities as “network[s] of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in . . . particular domain[s] and . . . authoritative claim[s] to policy-relevant knowledge within [a] domain or issue area”).
283. See id. at 2.
284. Emanuel Adler, The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and
the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control, 46 INT’L ORG. 101 (1992).
285. See id. at 111–24.
286. See id. at 124–33.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 133–40.
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Soviet Union signed in 1972 to place limitations on ballistic missile defenses.289
Additional case studies have observed comparable influence in such diverse policy
domains as international trade,290 whaling regulations,291 food aid,292 international
banking,293 Mediterranean pollution control,294 and efforts to stem the spread of AIDS.295
This research bolsters the training thesis insofar as a national collection of lawyers, policy makers, and academics working in the discipline of international law
constitutes an epistemic community. As one example, Frans van Waarden and
Michaela Drahos contend that an epistemic community comprising legal scholars,
lawyers, judges, policy makers, and business consultants with expertise in competition law was the most important force behind a convergence toward stricter antitrust
norms in EU member states.296 In their account, national convergence happened organically, without either market integration or explicit EU efforts to harmonize state
legislation, because community interactions in academic and professional fora facilitated a transnational exchange and diffusion of ideas and promoted consensus
among community members, who in turn utilized their domestic influence to ensure
that the community episteme shaped policy at home.297 Framed in similar terms, the
training thesis posits that domestic approaches to the study of international law will
shape compliance by empowering or limiting the influence of domestic and global
epistemic communities of international legal experts. Where training is pervasive,
rigorous, and supportive, the epistemic community will be able to diffuse its expertise more broadly and establish influence over a larger number of future government
elites, which will in turn promote compliance. Where training is limited, poor in
quality, or hostile, the domestic epistemic community will have a harder time acquiring influence, and any transnational or international counterpart will suffer from
fewer national collaborators.
In summary, university courses can affect compliance because they can shape the
ideas that generations of students internalize about international law, and students
can later act under the influence of those ideas as government elites, activists, law
practitioners, and experts. This thesis does not claim that the collective influence of
law graduates in any single role will necessarily suffice to yield parallel state action.
But it does posit that such a scenario is possible. Moreover, assuming common

289. Id. at 102.
290. See William J. Drake & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization:
“Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT’L ORG. 37 (1992).
291. See M. J. Peterson, Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International
Management of Whaling, 46 INT’L ORG. 147 (1992).
292. See Raymond F. Hopkins, Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of
Consensual Knowledge, 46 INT’L ORG. 225 (1992).
293. See Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, Between Power and Purpose: Central Bankers and the
Politics of Regulatory Convergence, 46 INT’L ORG. 265 (1992).
294. See Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control, 43 INT’L ORG. 377 (1989).
295. See Jeremy Youde, The Development of a Counter-Epistemic Community: AIDS,
South Africa, and International Regimes, 19 INT’L REL. 421 (2005).
296. Frans van Waarden & Michaela Drahos, Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the
Convergence of Competition Policies, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 913, 923–32 (2002).
297. Id. at 928–32.
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training, it suggests that waves of new lawyers executing a multiplicity of
professional roles will act under the influence of the same messages about
international law, and that the aggregate influence of these individuals is sufficient
to shape the manner in which a state approaches the question of compliance. Thus,
while the international system is anarchic in the sense that there is no global
institution with general legal authority to coerce sovereign states, legal training can
influence state compliance policies. The international order does not dictate
international law’s irrelevance; anarchy is in part what law schools make of it.
B. Regime Type as a Mediator
Even if all curricula were identical, it is unlikely that training’s influence would
remain constant among different states. Inevitably, cross-national variables will mediate the extent to which individual professional attitudes translate into state policies
of compliance with or disregard for international law. Perhaps the most important of
these is the type of governmental structure under which a national collection of law
graduates operates. Much of the preceding analysis and supporting evidence assumes
a democratic state that leaves a domestic legal community with multiple avenues of
influence, but of course many states substantially depart from that model in ways that
will affect the manner and possibly the extent of professional sway over the policymaking process. Part III.B. draws on the work of Jeffrey Checkel and Thomas RisseKappen, among others, to offer a typology of domestic regimes and then to
hypothesize on how each might mediate training’s effects.298 I anticipate that whether
and how law schools teach international law can affect compliance rates even in illiberal states, but that the professional roles that matter will vary by regime type.
The first step in this analysis is to recognize simply that there are different forms
of national governance structures under which professionals might work to promote
or undermine obedience. Checkel proposes that there are four basic structural categories, each of which has a unique effect on the mechanisms by which international
norms diffuse domestically.299 First, in a liberal structure, “the role of elites is highly
constrained” and policy is formed from the bottom up, the result of which is that
“societal pressure explains the domestic empowerment of global norms.”300 Checkel
offers the United States as an example.301 Second, at the opposite end of the typology
is the state-above-society structure, which has a “‘top-down’ policy-making environment.”302 In this category, typified by the former Soviet Union, the domestic empowerment of international norms depends exclusively on elite learning.303 In between
the two extremes are corporatist and statist structures in which societal pressure and

298. For relevant works by Checkel, see supra notes 24–25. For other relevant works, see,
e.g., Erick Bleich, From International Ideas to Domestic Policies: Educational Multiculturalism in England and France, 31 COMP. POL. 81 (1998); Andrew P. Cortell & James W.
Davis, Jr., How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International
Rules and Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 451 (1996).
299. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics, supra note 24, at 478–80.
300. Id. at 478.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 479.
303. Id.
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elite learning share influence.304 Government elites in the corporatist category have
more influence than their counterparts in liberal states, but social pressure is still the
most important determinant of norm empowerment.305 The example here is the
Federal Republic of Germany.306 Finally, in the statist structure, exemplified by
France, relative influence is simply reversed: societal pressure is not irrelevant, but
learning by government elites plays a more dominant role.307
This typology operates in tension with the training thesis insofar as it suggests
that there are states in which the preferences of government officials do not matter.
As the preceding analysis makes clear, there is quite a bit of evidence that officials
will always exert some form of material and independent influence over state action,
whether by directly injecting their preferences into policy or by providing cues that
help to mold public opinion.308 The result is that the existence of truly liberal states
is questionable—most, including the United States, fall into the other three categories. But Checkel’s analysis is nevertheless useful, for in suggesting that national
governance structures generally dictate the mechanisms of norm empowerment, the
typology offers a starting point for hypothesizing about the more specific issue of
cross-national variation in the means by which lawyers are able to translate professional ideology into state policy.
Checkel’s ideas are easy to extend. For example, insofar as there are truly liberal
states, activists, practitioners, and experts should exert the most significant influence
over compliance policies—activists by mobilizing public opinion or lobbying government actors, practitioners by incrementally incorporating international norms into
private transactions and dispute resolution, and experts by shaping public opinion.
Public officials in these states should, by contrast, hold limited, if any, influence, as
the government acts simply to effectuate societal demands. At the other extreme,
where the state is above society, activists and independent law practitioners should
have far more limited influence, while government elites should dominate as they
decide policy free of popular pressures. In this context, independent legal experts
might also play a role, but only insofar as they help to shape the views of official
decision makers, rather than by influencing public opinion. Likewise, it may be difficult for private practitioners in states with top-down structures to generate compliance due to the absence of an independent judiciary. To put these ideas more concretely, legal training will matter mostly for its effect on future government lawyers
and expert consultants in statist or state-above-society regimes such as Iran and
Cuba, but more for its effect on future activists, private practitioners, and public intellectuals in liberal regimes such as Canada and Sweden.
Another possibility is that regime type influences the degree of professional influence over compliance decisions. It is plausible, in other words, that the effect of
training is more substantial under liberal and corporatist structures because these
leave open more avenues by which lawyers can transform their professional orientations into state action. Policy is not simply a product of elite decision making, but
rather the aggregation of activist, practitioner, and expert influences, all of which will

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.1.
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tend to point in the same direction, whether in favor of or against compliance,
depending on the nature of the training that occurs. If accepted, this proposition
would mean that legal training is most effective at explaining compliance rates in
comparatively liberal states. It is also plausible, however, that professional influence
is more intense under statist and state-above-society structures, because these grant
government elites substantial freedom to transform their attitudes about international
law directly into state policy. Only a relatively small number of individuals with legal
backgrounds will have influence, but their influence will be more substantial because
the closed political structure excludes societal actors who might possess interests
contrary to the predominant professional orientation.309 If accepted, this proposition
would mean that legal training is more effective at explaining the compliance rates
of illiberal governments that include government lawyers in their decision-making
processes. Given a dearth of empirical testing, I offer no conclusions on these points
other than to say that they are possibilities that future research should consider.
But even if domestic political structures influence the means and degree to which
law schools influence compliance, the training thesis contends that legal education
will always generate congruent policy effects over the long term. There are two reasons for this. First, the multiplicity of professional roles available to individuals with
legal training renders law schools’ influence resilient. For legal training not to matter,
there must be a state in which legal education occurs but graduates are never government officials, activists, law practitioners, or experts. That is essentially a null set.
Second, scholars have shown in a variety of case studies that activists are able to
influence state action regardless of regime type.310 Margaret Keck and Kathryn
Sikkink go so far as to suggest that domestic human rights activists can bypass the
state and even change domestic structures by networking with international allies to
generate multiple sources of pressure for reform.311 As discussed above,312 legal

309. Cf. Matthew Evangelista, Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security
Policy in the USSR and Russia, in BRINGING TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NONSTATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 146, 172–88
(Thomas Risse-Kappen ed., 1995) (discussing how the opening up of the Soviet system paradoxically made it more difficult for disarmament proponents to influence Russian policy by
forcing them to compete with other societal actors who held contrary views); Risse-Kappen,
supra note 24, at 208–12 (explaining that a liberal internationalist community influenced the
security policy of the Soviet Union more than that of the United States because the Soviet
Union had a centralized decision-making structure that only required the community to acquire
influence among government elites, while the United States had an open, society-dominated
structure that required the more complicated task of forming a stable and winning political
coalition).
310. Compare, e.g., Klotz, supra note 258 (revealing how transnational anti-apartheid activists mobilized U.S. support for sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s), with THE
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE, supra note 259
(collecting case studies on the influence of transnational human rights networks in illiberal
states).
311. MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1–2 (1998); see also Risse & Sikkink, supra note 259,
at 4, 18 (incorporating this idea into a “spiral model” of state socialization).
312. See supra Part II.B.

1500

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 92:1449

education can play a role in these dynamics by substantially influencing the number
of individuals who are sufficiently informed and motivated to press for action.
IV. MERITS AND IMPLICATIONS
To recap, the argument is that there are significant global disparities in international legal education, and that this condition likely limits the efficacy of
international law by socializing influential professionals to understand and value international law in divergent ways, thereby generating varying levels of official understanding and concern for international norms. A variety of evidence from the field
of social psychology suggests that legal education can persuade law students to adopt
attitudes about public international law that faculties have chosen to privilege, and
that those attitudes may be sufficiently robust to persist after graduation and influence professional behavior. Where formal instruction is pervasive, rigorous, and ideologically oriented to support the discipline, classes of law graduates are more likely
to identify and use international law, and to consider carefully and act in accordance
with a pro-compliance message on covered topics. Where training is optional, unavailable, or lacking in rigor, or where professors frame the discipline in an unfavorable way, the effect could range from ignorance to a sense that international law
is peripheral and unequal to domestic law, plus parallel behavioral consequences. In
turn, evidence from political science suggests that law graduates may wield sufficient
collective influence to ensure that their attitudes affect state policy. By the transitive
property, universities could materially influence the efficacy of international law.
This thesis, to be clear, does not anticipate that training is the only determinant of
national policy. Nor does it make any claim about the relative importance of legal
training in comparison to other conceivable influences. Nor, finally, does it suggest
that training will produce immediate effects. The idea is simply that law schools
might over time exert material influence over the way in which a government understands international law and approaches decisions about whether to adhere to it. Below, I discuss the merits and implications of thinking about global norms in this way.
A. Merits
From a theoretical standpoint, the training thesis has several strengths. First, it
brings psychology back to its natural home by focusing on the mental processes that
occur within human beings. A sizable volume of legal scholarship has incorporated
insights from social psychology, but much of this work has treated juridical entities
such as states as the unit of analysis.313 Insofar as entities cannot think other than
through the human beings that comprise them, such an approach risks error by personifying abstractions and overlooking the aggregations of individual cognitions that
determine institutional behavior. By treating the microprocesses of human psychology as a key source of institutional behavior, the training thesis avoids this problem.

313. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (identifying social mechanisms
for influencing states, and discussing acculturation as a distinct mechanism with unique implications for human rights promotion).
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Second, the thesis draws attention to a potentially important source of norm
internalization, and one that legal scholars and political scientists typically ignore.
The vast literature on norms includes a number of works that focus on government
agencies and international organizations as persuasion venues. Martha Finnemore,
for example, explains that many states adopted national science policy bureaucracies
in the mid-twentieth century because the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) taught national officials at international conferences, in private meetings, and through correspondence that such bureaucracies are
effective tools for achieving legitimate state interests in the coordination and direction of scientific research.314 I certainly do not deny that this sort of persuasion happens. But in the long run, the classroom is plausibly a more effective place for it.
Consistent with the social psychological evidence discussed above, theorists have
suggested that norm internalization is most likely where contact with a persuasive
message is intense, significant in duration, and less politicized; where the persuadee
has few ingrained beliefs on the subject matter and is in a novel or uncertain environment; and where the persuader “is an authoritative member of the ingroup to
which the [perusadee] belongs or wants to belong” and does not lecture “but, instead,
acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.”315 It seems that these conditions
describe classroom persuasion better than any alternative.
Consider, for example, how elite socialization runs headlong into a couple of
problems that student socialization largely avoids: First, individuals are more susceptible to persuasion when their preexisting, message-relevant cognitions are limited or otherwise inaccessible.316 This is a boon for student socialization, which tends
to involve individuals whose limited prior exposure to a discipline makes them more
impressionable,317 but a problem for elite socialization, which tends to involve established professionals who may have acquired robust, issue-relevant schema through
both education and substantial time in the field. Put differently, it will be easier to
persuade John Bolton the law student than John Bolton the Under Secretary of
State.318 Second, the use of culturally dissonant message frames tends to limit persuasion by undermining a message’s affective appeal.319 This tendency should complicate international and foreign efforts to socialize domestic elites, who often will
not share a common cultural background with the message source, but, if anything,
contribute to persuasion in the law school setting. The idea here is that law

314. Martha Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy, 47 INT’L ORG.
565 (1993).
315. Checkel, supra note 25, at 810–13; see also Checkel, Why Comply?, supra note 24,
at 562–64; Liesbet Hooghe, Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few via International Socialization: A Case Study of the European Commission, 59 INT’L ORG. 861, 866–68
(2005).
316. See Wood, supra note 178; Wu & Shaffer, supra note 193.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 192–97.
318. Cf. Hooghe, supra note 315, at 887 (finding that socialization in the European Commission is limited in part because “international organizations rarely benefit from the primacy
effect—the opportunity to influence members in their young adult years”).
319. See, e.g., Sang-Pil Han & Sharon Shavitt, Persuasion and Culture: Advertising Appeals
in Individualistic and Collectivistic Societies, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 326 (1994).
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professors, who tend to come from the states in which they teach, will possess
sufficient fluency in national culture to identify and utilize appropriate frames for
greater persuasive effect. Put differently, cultural fluency makes it easier for an
American law professor to persuade American law students than for a U.N. official
from, say, Switzerland to persuade members of Congress, all else being equal.320
Third, the thesis offers a deeper explanation for state behavior by suggesting that
many of the phenomena and actors covered in the literature are simply intermediate
variables that channel training’s influence. It may help to explain, for example, the
domestic diffusion and empowerment of international norms.321 And it suggests a
potentially important source of the attitudes that drive nonstate actors like norm entrepreneurs, activists, and epistemic communities to promote or undermine state
compliance.
Finally, the thesis appears more meritorious upon acknowledging the cognitive
biases that might generate unwarranted skepticism among readers. One is a bias in
favor of proximate causation—there is a natural tendency to assign greater relevance
to independent or intervening variables that are closer in causal structure to a dependent variable, even when distant causation is established.322 Applied here, this would
manifest as an irrational tendency to discount the significance of universities in favor
of variables that operate more directly on compliance decisions, such as contemporary public opinion or bureaucratic pressures. A second is the so-called bias blind
spot—people tend to view their own perceptions as less susceptible to bias than those
of others.323 The result may be an unwarranted tendency to perceive oneself as an
independent and neutral analyst who is immune from the influence of an idiosyncratic intellectual upbringing.
B. Implications
Thinking about the evidence of global curricular variation in light of the training
thesis generates a number of significant implications. Some of these hold regardless
of one’s normative priors, but I frame others in a way that presupposes a commitment
to effective international law. For readers who do not share that commitment, the
prescriptions may be different, but either way, divergent normative preferences do
not affect the causal argument; they merely inform what one does with it.
First, the training thesis suggests a substantial research agenda. Additional empirical work is necessary to identify more fully the nature of cross-national differences
in international legal education. Scholars might profitably supplement the

320. Cf. Price, supra note 255, at 627–31 (discussing how the international campaign to
ban antipersonnel land mines was successful in part because it managed to frame the proposed
prohibition in a way that resonated with preexisting norms).
321. Cf. Checkel, Why Comply?, supra note 24, at 557–59 (discussing the significance of
norm diffusion).
322. See Russell C. Burnett, Close Does Count: Evidence of a Proximity Effect in Inference
from Causal Knowledge, 27 PROCS. ANN. MEETING COGNITIVE SCI. SOC’Y 366 (2005), http://
www.psych.unito.it/csc/cogsci05/frame/poster/2/f509-burnett.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX4Q-ABV7].
323. Joyce Ehrlinger, Thomas Gilovich & Lee Ross, Peering into the Bias Blind Spot:
People’s Assessments of Bias in Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 680, 681 (2005).
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PILMap.org site with data on bar examinations, elective courses, casebook content,
the professional backgrounds of international legal academics, and judicial and prosecutorial training, among other topics. There are also important causal questions to
explore: Does the completion of an introductory course on public international law
yield attitude change among students? If so, how long does the change persist? In
which types of national governments does legal education have the greatest effect on
state policy? Why do some states compel the study of international law while others
do not? And what are the concrete effects of cross-national differences for matters
such as treaty compliance and popular attitudes about international norms? Scholars
might profitably address these questions through both qualitative and quantitative
studies and thus help to illuminate the role of universities as venues for the reflection
and diffusion of international norms.
Second, the training thesis suggests that there may be systemic barriers to the efficacy of international law even from a constructivist perspective. International law
is formally universal, but the evidence described in Part I shows that it is, to varying
degrees, practically parochial: many students graduate without obtaining even basic
education about the discipline, while others acquire training that is poor in quality or
peculiar in its topical emphases or ideological orientation. The likely result is a collection of states with varying numbers of government elites, activists, private practitioners, and experts who have studied international law, and varying levels of
knowledge about and subjective commitment to international norms within those
groups. If anything, such conditions may complicate enforcement by generating inconsistency of understanding, irregularity of application, and confusion.
To put the matter more concretely, the evidence from Part I supports hypotheses
about the effects of legal education in and between specific countries. For instance,
one might imagine that universities in Scandinavian states contribute to the efficacy
of international human rights norms by requiring all students to complete courses
that are analytically rigorous and norm-supportive.324 At the opposite extreme, legal
education probably fails to contribute in any way to the domestic acceptance of international norms in places like the Central African Republic, where functioning law
schools do not appear to exist.325 In between these poles, universities in much of the
developing world, such as India and many African states, generally require students
to study international law but seem to lack the resources to take advantage of the
classroom’s full persuasive potential.326 Insofar as professors do not possess the professional background, teaching materials, or financial incentive to expend the time

324. Compare Scoville, supra note 21 (reporting that all law schools in Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden require students to complete a course on public international law), with World
University Rankings 2014-15, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION, http://www.timeshighereducation
.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2014-15/world-ranking [https://perma.cc/C3SU-3UMZ]
(favorably reviewing the quality of several Scandinavian universities) and Bradford & Posner,
supra note 115, at 14 (“The EU maintains a strong commitment to international human
rights.”).
325. See Ryan M. Scoville, Country: Central African Republic, WHO STUDIES
INTERNATIONAL LAW? A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/Details/CF [https://perma.cc
/PPG3-ZQPD] (reporting that there are no law schools with functioning websites in the Central
African Republic).
326. Compare Ryan M. Scoville, Continental Maps, WHO STUDIES INTERNATIONAL LAW?
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necessary for effective instruction, it is doubtful that international law students in
these states will have an adequate opportunity to understand their subject, let alone
internalize robust attitudes about its claim to legal status. Parts of the developed
world appear to suffer from a different problem. In countries like the United States,
the issue is not one of instructional quality as much as one of pervasiveness and
ideological orientation—international law is almost entirely elective, has not been
particularly popular among students, and has a hard time distinguishing itself from
foreign relations law.327 The probable consequences are limited knowledge among
graduates and a general sense of uncertainty about the value of the discipline. For
example, recounting his own experience as a student, David Kennedy explains that
the marginal status of international law in his school’s curriculum left him “sceptical
about the institutional stature that international law seemed to be claiming for itself”
and feeling that the discipline was “subservient to a private municipal practice.”328
In the aggregate, these kinds of conditions suggest a global order comprising states
whose nationals hold varying levels of understanding and concern for international
norms. This is an order in which noncompliance should come as no surprise.
Of course, it is likely the case that, in any given state, elites with substantial influence over the foreign policy bureaucracy will be better trained in international law
than the average graduate. In that sense, there will probably always be a class of
knowledgeable domestic actors who both support the idea of international law and
exert influence over state policy. But even insofar as that is true, the training thesis
identifies a problem: where study is uncommon or lacking in rigor, most graduates
will not have internalized robust attitudes on compliance questions, and any state
decisions to follow international obligations are likely to result not from broad and
deep commitment within domestic legal communities, but instead the work of a thin
crust of elite specialists. In states where non-elite attitudes matter, commitments
might be fragile. When even many law graduates do not understand international
law, it may be overly optimistic to expect national publics to value compliance for
its own sake.
A third implication is perhaps the most tantalizing: the thesis would place the
efficacy of international law partly in the hands of those who teach. This is probably
an invigorating thought to many readers, but neither the degree, nor the direction, nor
the cross-national uniformity of the classroom’s persuasive influence is a given. The
degree to which instruction shapes student attitudes is likely to depend on a raft of
nano-choices about the curriculum, pedagogy, and resource allocation. Individual
professors will intensify the persuasive impact of their courses by requiring extensive
class participation, selecting compelling reading materials, creating opportunities for

A GLOBAL SURVEY, http://pilmap.org/ContinentalMaps [https://perma.cc/WKP4-G3DE] (reporting high rates of compulsory study in Africa), with Scoville, Country: India, supra note
42 (reporting that all law students in India must complete a course on international law), and
supra notes 94–95 (collecting sources on the state of legal education in lesser-developed
countries).
327. See Barrett, supra note 39, at 854–55 (same); Ku & Borgen, supra note 39, at 502–03
(describing how enrollment rates in international law courses in the United States have historically been low); Scoville, supra note 31 (reporting that only four percent of U.S. law schools
require a course concerning international law).
328. David Kennedy, International Legal Education, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 361, 367 (1985).
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personal interaction with students, addressing counterarguments, providing students
with opportunities to act in ways that approximate the roles of established practitioners, and otherwise approaching the quality of their instruction as a professional priority.329 The standard lecture is less likely to persuade.
The direction of persuasion is also a choice. While the language and authorities
of international law are generally norm supportive, there is ample space for different
angles of approach. Just as one might lecture on ways in which the discipline has
shaped state action, draw students’ attention to fundamental similarities with domestic law,330 and otherwise frame international law in a positive way, one could easily
highlight compliance problems and call into question the value of the field. Either
way, the research suggests that there will be an attentive and impressionable
audience.
Still other choices concern the issue of cross-national uniformity. International
law academics might promote uniformity through professional cosmopolitanism.
They might seek out dialogue and collaboration with counterparts in other states,
organize and attend international conferences, and work with foreign coauthors to
diffuse and harmonize understandings across borders.331 Some of this happens already, but cosmopolitanism appears uncommon where it is needed most—namely,
among scholars from different civilizations and states with antagonistic relationships.
Ideally, we would see events like Sino-Japanese conferences on the law of the sea,
papers coauthored by Indian and Pakistani scholars, and far more dialogue between
Americans and Russians. There are real logistical challenges to reckon with here,
including language and distance, but the alternative is insularity and the likely perpetuation of cross-national difference.
Law schools are not off the hook in this analysis. Much is up to individual professors, but there are important organizational decisions to be made, including
whether to make a course on international law mandatory, whether to offer few or
many elective courses in the discipline, and whether to incorporate international topics into courses that are traditionally domestic in orientation. Other choices might
also make a difference, such as whether to promote and support international law
journals, library acquisitions of international law volumes, and guest speakers on
relevant topics. These types of environmental influences might supplement procompliance messaging in the classroom by signaling international law’s status as a
priority for not just one professor, but the law school as a whole. Given their outsized
influence within the profession, elite law schools may play a particularly important
role in deciding the popularization of these reforms.332
The prescriptions here are obvious. Above all, academics should think hard about

329. See supra Part II.B.
330. Cf. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791 (2009) (identifying fundamental similarities
between international law and U.S. constitutional law).
331. Cf. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 152
(1983) (identifying the “growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations” as an important source of isomorphism).
332. Cf. id. (“Organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their
field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful.”).
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pedagogy and approach instruction with an eye toward the compliance messages they
send. These are issues of delicacy, in which minutiae can matter a great deal. My
impression is that, at least in the United States, instruction tends to focus on a canonical set of issues and cases regardless of persuasive consequences. For example, decisions such as the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States)333 and the Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States)334 are not only common fare
in American classrooms, but are common fare in substantial part because of the compliance problems they expose. Such problems are undoubtedly of interest, but the
amount of attention they receive suggests that even supporters of international law
suffer from a certain lack of confidence. Most criminal law professors do not devote
any of their introductory lectures to compliance issues even though violence and drug
use are common. Why the difference? Perhaps it is time to rethink parts of international law’s introductory canon.
Fourth, the thesis could help to identify the practical significance of other compliance theories, such as scholarship on transnational legal process by Harold Koh335
and Abram and Antonia Chayes336 and, on the other side, rationalist analyses by
scholars such as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner.337 These works tend to come across
as academic debates with limited practical significance. But the training thesis suggests that they are critically important as source material for the narratives that faculties present to generations of future professionals. The persuasive merits of compliance theories might affect state behavior by making it possible for instructors to
present intellectually honest arguments consistent with a particular view about international law’s status, and by influencing the extent to which law schools are in fact
able to persuade students to view international law as a body of genuine legal obligations that require obedience. The content of a message, after all, is an important
determinant of attitude change in central-route processing.338 To the extent that faculties side with and are able to draw students’ attention to a theory of compliance
that is compelling, graduates are more likely to enter any number of professional
roles with congruent views about the relevance and weight of global norms.
There are also consequences for policy makers. While it is far from universal for
states to require their law graduates to study international law, a number of them

333. Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27) (holding that the United States violated international law pertaining to the use of force by supporting the Contras in their opposition to
the government of Nicaragua); see also U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2718th mtg. at 51, U.N. Doc.
S/PV.2718 (Oct. 28, 1986) (documenting the U.S. veto of a resolution calling for compliance
with the Nicaragua judgment).
334. Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Mar. 31) (holding that the United States breached
Article 36.1(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); see also Medellin v. Texas,
552 U.S. 491, 504–23 (2008) (holding that the Avena judgment is not directly enforceable in
federal court).
335. See Koh, supra note 29.
336. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
337. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).
338. See supra Part II.B.2.
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do.339 Moreover, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly emphasized the importance of this area of study,340 and some treaties specifically call for education on
the rules they codify.341 The training thesis suggests that national governments and
international organizations might profitably extend these efforts by agreeing, formally or informally, to mandate and standardize international legal education, or
even by promoting the idea of a nascent custom that obliges states to compel training.
International actors may also view development assistance as a mechanism for improving the efficacy of international law over the long run, and domestic policy makers may view governmental curriculum standards and bar examinations as compliance issues.
CONCLUSION
Ideas matter. Education matters. Law graduates are collectively influential. These
notions, each of which is uncontroversial, combine to sustain the plausibility of the
training thesis. There is reason to think that anarchy is in part what law schools make
of it. Stated another way, it is implausible that legal education has no effect on the
efficacy of international law. As Peter Hall explained years ago:
[I]deas acquire force when they find organizational means of expression.
Most ideas have some power on their own: a number of people will be
persuaded by them. But the social power of any set of ideas is magnified
when those ideas are taken up by a powerful political organization, integrated with other ideological appeals, and widely disseminated.342
In this case, the powerful organization is the university. Attitudes about international
law do not simply exist; they must come from somewhere, and it is reasonable to
think that at least one of their principal sources is the classroom, which provides the
only significant training on international law that most lawyers ever receive. If this
is right, then national aggregations of small choices about curricular design and classroom instruction carry significant policy consequences over the long run, and noncompliance should come as no surprise, given the varied state of training around the
globe.

339. See Scoville, supra note 21.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 77–83.
341. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 10(1), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 112.
342. PETER HALL, GOVERNING THE ECONOMY 280 (1986).

